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Abstract
While classical Description Logics (DLs) concentrate on the representation of static conceptual
knowledge, recently there is a growing interest in DLs that, additionally, allow to capture the temporal
aspects of conceptual knowledge. Such temporal DLs are based either on time points or on time
intervals as the temporal primitive. Whereas point-based temporal DLs are well-investigated, this
is not the case for interval-based temporal DLs: all known logics either suffer from rather limited
expressive power or have undecidable reasoning problems. In particular, there exists no decidable
interval-based temporal DL that provides for general TBoxes—one of the most important expressive
means in modern description logics. In this paper, for the first time we define an interval-temporal
DL that is equipped with general TBoxes and for which reasoning is decidable (and, more precisely,
EXPTIME-complete).
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1. Introduction
Description Logics (DLs) are a family of logics that originated in artificial intelligence
as a tool for reasoning about conceptual knowledge, and are nowadays used in a broad
spectrum of applications [6]. The fundamental notion of knowledge representation with
DLs is that of a concept, where complex concepts are constructed from the following
atoms: concept names (unary predicates), role names (binary predicates), and a set of
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concept constructors that are provided by the chosen DL. For example, the following
concept is formulated in the basic description logic ALC [34]:
Human Male  ∃has-child.Human
In this example, Human and Male are concept names while has-child is a role name. It
should be easy to see that, intuitively, the above concept describes fathers.
Whereas classical DLs concentrate on the representation of “static” conceptual
knowledge (such as in the above example), recently there is a growing interest in
“dynamic” DLs that allow to incorporate, e.g., temporal and epistemic aspects of the
application domain. Concerning temporal description logics, we can distinguish several
quite different approaches (see, e.g., the survey [2]). The most important decision to be
made when devising a temporal DL is whether time points or time intervals should be
the temporal primitive, since this decision has a serious ontological impact and may have
dramatic consequences for issues of decidability and computational complexity.
In modal and temporal logics, to which description logics are very closely related
[13,32], time points are the most popular temporal atom, see, e.g., the handbook [12].
Consequently, there has been a series of papers on temporal DLs that use time points
as their temporal primitive in the same spirit as modal and temporal logics do [27,33,
36,41]. These logics offer an interesting expressivity and sometimes have quite attractive
computational properties. However, their expressive power is not strong enough to talk
about time intervals in a satisfying way.
In artificial intelligence, time intervals have a strong tradition as a temporal primitive
since Allen’s seminal 1983 paper [1], see, e.g., the handbook [11]. As DLs form a subfield
of artificial intelligence, it is hardly surprising that interval-based temporal DLs also
received a considerable amount of attention. The expressive power of such DLs is usually
based on concept constructors that refer to the 13 Allen relations, which describe all
possible ways in which two time intervals can be related. While the advantage of interval-
based temporal DLs is that they provide an appealing expressivity, their disadvantage is that
it can be rather hard to avoid undecidability of reasoning. For example, the first interval-
based temporal DL proposed by Schmiedel [35] can easily be proved to be undecidable
by reduction of Halpern and Shoham’s (undecidable) modal logic of time intervals [15].
Based on this observation, researchers have tried either to live with undecidability [8] or to
find variants of Schmiedel’s original logic that are still decidable [3].
The main obstacle for many potential applications of decidable interval-based tempo-
ral DLs is that, in order to avoid undecidability, these DLs do not provide for so-called
general TBoxes. General TBoxes are finite sets of concept equations and a very impor-
tant expressive means provided by all state-of-the-art “static” description logics, and by
all modern DL reasoning systems such as FaCTand RACER [14,18]. The importance of
TBoxes stems from the fact that they allow to capture terminological knowledge and back-
ground knowledge of an application domain. For example, the following concept equation
defines the notion “father” (thus capturing terminological knowledge):
Father .= Human Male  ∃has-child.Human
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However, concept equations need not define notions. They can also describe background
knowledge in the form of more general constraints:
¬∃has-child.Human .= ∃has-favorite.Nightclub.
This concept equation states that people having no children are precisely those people
having a favorite nightclub.
The contribution of this paper is to describe a decidable temporal description logic
T DL that provides for general TBoxes and allows interval-based temporal representation
and reasoning. Indeed, T DL is natively point-based, but admits a straightforward
representation of Allen’s interval relations, thus being a suitable tool for intermixed point-
and interval-based temporal reasoning with general TBoxes. More precisely, T DL extends
the basic propositionally closed description logic ALC with
– general TBoxes;
– abstract features, i.e., role names interpreted in functional relations;
– temporal features: a new syntactic type that allows to associate time points (rational
numbers) with domain elements;
– a temporal concept constructor allowing to state that two time points attached via
temporal features are in one of the relations <,,=, =,,>.
For example, the following T DL-concept equation expresses that children are born after
their parents were:
 .= Human→∃((mother birthday) < birthday)  ∃((father birthday) < birthday).
In this equation, mother and father are abstract features, and birthday is a temporal
feature whose value is the birthday of persons encoded as a rational number—a time
point. The conjuncts in the consequence of the implication are both instantiations of the
temporal concept constructor and must not be confused with the existential restriction as
in ∃child.Human. Note that (mother birthday) denotes composition of the abstract feature
mother with the temporal feature birthday.
We have claimed that Allen’s interval relations can straightforwardly be encoded in
T DL. Assume, for example, that we want to represent the life-time of people by a time
interval and then describe persons whose life-time is properly overlapping (this is one of the
Allen relations) with that of their mother. The obvious idea is to represent intervals in terms
of their start- and end-point and then to use the relations on time points <,,=, =,,>
to define Allen’s interval relations. To represent the above example, we could thus write
Human  ∃((mother ) < )  ∃((mother r) < r)
 ∃( < r)  ∃((mother ) < (mother r)),
where the temporal feature  represents left interval endpoints and the temporal feature r
represents right interval endpoints. Since this concept requires close inspection to reveal
that it talks about the Allen relation “overlaps”, we will define a representation framework
that builds on T DL and treats time intervals (and time points) as first-class citizens. In this
framework, we can reformulate the above concept as
Human  ∃(mother overlaps self).
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Here, mother is still an abstract feature and self is a keyword of the framework. Concrete
features do not appear explicitly in this abbreviated syntax. More details are provided in
Section 3. It is interesting to note that interval-based temporal representation with T DL
is similar in spirit to the Allen-based temporal constraint networks (see, e.g., [1,29,38,
40]) rather than to Schmiedel’s or Halpern and Shoham’s interval-based description/modal
logics. A more detailed comparison of these two families of interval-based temporal
description logics can be found in [4], which investigates the relationship between a relative
of T DL and the logic T L-ALCF , a decidable and interval-based temporal DL that both
restricts and extends Schmiedel’s original proposal [3]. However, also T L-ALCF does
not provide for general TBoxes.
There exists a second, non-temporal view on the description logic T DL that we should
also like to discuss. One shortcoming of simple description logics such as ALC is that they
represent knowledge on an abstract logic level, thus prohibiting an adequate representation
of “concrete knowledge” such as knowledge about sizes, weights, ages, or even spatial
extensions. To eliminate this deficiency, DLs have been extended with so-called concrete
domains as first proposed in [5], for a recent survey consult [25]. The relationship between
T DL and description logics with concrete domains is a rather intimate one: indeed, T DL
can be viewed as the extension of ALC with general TBoxes and a particular concrete
domain (more details are provided in Section 2). Due to this fact, the results proved in
this paper can be viewed in a different light. In [26], the extension of ALC with concrete
domains and general TBoxes has been considered. As it turns out, the resulting logic is
undecidable for many interesting concrete domains. It has been an open problem whether
there exist any useful concrete domains that can be combined with general TBoxes without
loosing decidability. Since T DL can be viewed as being equipped with a concrete domain
and, in our opinion, is a very useful DL, we answer this question to the affirmative.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formally introduce the description
logic T DL and discuss its relationship to concrete domains on more formal grounds.
Section 3 starts with a description of the framework for representing mixed point- and
interval-based temporal information. To illustrate the usefulness of both T DL and the
representation framework, we then describe an example application from the area of
process engineering. In Section 4, we use an approached based on automata on infinite
trees to show that satisfiability and subsumption of T DL-concepts w.r.t. general TBoxes
is decidable. This proof also provides us with a tight EXPTIME complexity bound. In
Section 5, we consider another common DL reasoning problem: ABox consistency. By
reduction to concept satisfiability, we prove that, in T DL, ABox consistency is also
EXPTIME-complete. The reduction is much less straightforward than, e.g., in the case of
ALC due to the presence of temporal information. Finally, we conclude in Section 6.
All results in this article are from the PhD thesis [22]. The results obtained in Section 4
have previously been published in the conference paper [20].
2. The description logic T DL
We formally introduce the description logic T DL, starting with the syntax. Examples
are delayed to the subsequent section.
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Definition 1 (T DL syntax). Let NC, NR, and NtF be mutually disjoint and countably infinite
sets of concept names, role names, and temporal features. We assume that NR is partitioned
into two countably infinite subsets NaF and NrR. The elements of NaF are called abstract
features and the elements of NrR regular roles. A path u is a composition f1 · · ·fng of n
abstract features f1, . . . , fn (n 0) and a temporal feature g. The set of T DL-concepts is
the smallest set such that
(1) every concept name is a concept,
(2) if C and D are concepts, R is a role name, g is a temporal feature, u1, u2 are paths,
and P ∈ {<,,=, =,,>}, then the following expressions are also concepts: ¬C,
C D, C unionsqD, ∃R.C, ∀R.C, ∃(u1 P u2), and g↑.
A concept equation is an expression of the form C .= D, where C and D are concepts.
A finite set of concept equations is called TBox.
The TBox formalism introduced in Definition 1 is often called general TBox since it
subsumes several other, much weaker variants [9,19]. Throughout this paper, we use  as
abbreviation for an arbitrary propositional tautology,⊥ for¬, and u↑ for ∀f1. · · · ∀fk.g↑
if u = f1 · · ·fkg. As most description logics, T DL is equipped with a Tarski-style set-
based semantics.
Definition 2 (T DL semantics). An interpretation I is a pair (∆I, ·I), where ∆I is a set
called the domain and ·I is the interpretation function. The interpretation function maps
• each concept name C to a subset CI of ∆I ,
• each role name R to a subset RI of ∆I ×∆I ,
• each abstract feature f to a partial function f I from ∆I to ∆I , and
• each temporal feature g to a partial function gI from ∆I to the rational numbersQ.1
For paths u= f1 · · ·fng and domain elements d ∈∆I , we set
uI(d) := gI (f In (· · · (f I1 (d)) · · ·)).
The interpretation function is extended to arbitrary concepts as follows:
(¬C)I :=∆I \CI ,
(C D)I := CI ∩DI ,
(C unionsqD)I := CI ∪DI ,
(∃R.C)I := {d ∈∆I | {e | (d, e) ∈RI} ∩CI = ∅},
(∀R.C)I := {d ∈∆I | {e | (d, e) ∈RI}⊆ CI},
∃(u1P u2)I :=
{
d ∈∆I | ∃x1, x2 ∈Q: uI1 (d)= x1, uI2 (d)= x2, and x1P x2
}
,
(g↑)I := {d ∈∆I | gI(d) undefined}.
1 It would not make a difference to use real numbers instead of rational numbers as time points. This is
discussed in more detail in Sections 4.1 and 6.
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An interpretation I is a model of a concept C iff CI = ∅. I is a model of a TBox T iff
it satisfies CI =DI for all concept equations C .=D in T .
Note that the temporal constructor ∃(u1Pu2) has an existential semantics since it forces
the interpretation of the paths u1 and u2 to be defined. The most important reasoning
problems for description logics are concept satisfiability and concept subsumption, i.e., the
questions whether a given concept can have any instances and whether one concept is more
general than another one [6]. For both reasoning tasks, a TBox T is used to describe the
“background theory”.
Definition 3 (Reasoning problems). Let C and D be concepts and T a TBox. C subsumes
D w.r.t. T (written D T C) iff DI ⊆ CI for all models T of T . C is satisfiable w.r.t. T
iff there exists a common model of C and T .
It is well known that (un)satisfiability and subsumption can be mutually reduced to
each other: C T D iff C  ¬D is unsatisfiable w.r.t. T and C is satisfiable w.r.t. T iff
C T ⊥. This fact allows us to concentrate on satisfiability since obtained decidability and
complexity results are easily “pulled over” to subsumption.
Another very important reasoning problem is so-called ABox consistency [6]. Intu-
itively, an ABox describes the state of affairs in the real-world at a particular time, i.e., it is
a “snapshot” of the real world. ABox consistency is then the ABox counterpart to concept
satisfiability.
Definition 4 (ABox, ABox consistency). Let Oa and Ot be a countably infinite and mutually
disjoint sets of object names and time point names. If C is a concept, R a role name, g a
temporal feature, P ∈ {<,,=, =,,>}, a, b ∈ Oa , and x, y ∈ Ot, then the following are
ABox assertions:
a :C, 〈a, b〉 :R, 〈a, x〉 : g, x P y.
A finite set of assertions is called an ABox. Interpretations I can be extended to ABoxes
by demanding that, additionally, ·I maps every object name a to an element aI of ∆I and
every time point name x to a rational number xI . An interpretation T then satisfies an
assertion
a :C iff aI ∈ CI
〈a, b〉 : R iff (aI, bI) ∈RI
〈a, x〉 : g iff gI(aI)= xI
xP y iff xIP yI .
An interpretation is a model of an ABox A iff it satisfies all assertions in A. An ABox A
is consistent w.r.t. a TBox T iff there exists a common model of A and T .
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Let us view an example T DL ABox:
Mary : Human John : Human
〈Mary, t1〉 : birthday 〈John, t2〉 : birthday
〈John,Mary〉 : father t2 < t1
where Human is a concept name, birthday a temporal feature, father an abstract feature,
Mary and John are from Oa, and t1 and t2 are from Ot. Obviously, this ABox states that
John is the father of Mary and that John was born before Mary was born.
Observe that concept satisfiability (and thus also concept subsumption) can be reduced
to ABox consistency: a concept C is satisfiable w.r.t. a TBox T iff the ABox {a : C} is
satisfiable w.r.t. T , where a ∈ Oa .
We now discuss the relationship between T DL and description logics with concrete
domains. To this end, let us introduce concrete domains formally.
Definition 5 (Concrete domain). A concrete domain D is a pair (∆D,ΦD), where ∆D is
a set called the domain, and ΦD is a set of predicate names. Each predicate name P ∈ΦD
is associated with an arity n and an n-ary predicate PD ⊆∆nD .
In Baader and Hanschke’s original proposal [5], concrete domains are integrated into
the description logic by using a concept constructor ∃u0, . . . , un.P , where u0, . . . , un are
paths and P ∈ ΦD is a predicate of arity n + 1. The semantics of this concrete domain
constructor is as follows:
(∃u0, . . . , un.P )I :=
{
d ∈∆I | ∃x0, . . . , xn ∈Q: uIi (d)= xi for i  n
and (x0, . . . , xn) ∈ PD
}
.
Hence, T DL can be viewed as being equipped with the concrete domain DT DL := (Q,
{<,,=, =,,>}), where all predicates are binary and have the obvious semantics.
We should also like to comment on a difference between T DL and some other
description logics with concrete domains: in their original proposal of concrete domains,
Baader and Hanschke do not distinguish between abstract and temporal features (which
are usually called “concrete features” in a non-temporal concrete domain context [25]),
but rather provide only one type of feature interpreted as a partial function from ∆I to
∆I ∪∆D . We prefer the separateness of features since, in our opinion, this yields a clearer
formalism while the difference in expressive power is negligible.
3. Temporal reasoning with T DL
In this section, we introduce a general framework for the representation of temporal
conceptual knowledge using the description logic T DL. As sketched in the introduction,
despite its point-based semantics T DL can be used as a full-fledged interval-based
temporal description logic. This fact is reflected by our framework, which allows to
freely combine point-based and interval-based temporal representation. The usefulness of
our framework is illustrated by several examples from the area of process engineering.
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ATemporal .= t↑  ↑  r↑
Temporal .= Point unionsq Interval
Point .= ∃(t = t)
Interval .= ∃( < r)
 .= ∃(t = t)→ (↑  r↑)
 (∃(= ) unionsq ∃(r = r))→ (∃( < r)  t↑)
Fig. 1. TBox T ∗ with basic definitions of the framework.
This application of description logics has already been considered, e.g., by Sattler and
Molitor [28,31]. However, in Sattler’s and Molitor’s approach only static knowledge about
process engineering is considered, i.e., there is no explicit representation of temporal
relationships. We use our framework to show how the temporal aspects of this application
domain can be represented in T DL, thus refining Sattler’s and Molitor’s model.
The representation framework consists of several conventions and abbreviations. We
assume that each entity of the application domain is either temporal or atemporal. If it is
temporal, its temporal extension may be either a time point or a time interval. We generally
assume that single time points are represented by the temporal feature t , left endpoints of
intervals are represented by the temporal feature , and right endpoints of intervals are
represented by the temporal feature r .2 This is captured by the TBox T ∗ displayed in
Fig. 1. The first four concept equations in the TBox define the relevant notions while the
fifth equation rules out pathological cases such as objects whose extension is both a point
and an interval. Note that concepts of the form ∃(t = t) are used only to express that
there exists an associated value for the temporal feature t . The TBox clearly implies that
the concepts ATemporal, Point, and Interval are mutually disjoint, and that their union is
equivalent to .
As noted in the introduction, interval-based reasoning with T DL is based on the Allen
interval relations [1], which are displayed in Fig. 2. To keep concepts readable, we define
a suitable abbreviation for each of the 13 relations. For example,
∃(p contains p′) abbreviates ∃(p < p′)  ∃(pr > p′r)
where p and p′ are sequences of abstract features. It is a straightforward job to derive
similar abbreviations for the other Allen relations given their definition in Fig. 2. In what
follows, we use self to denote the empty sequence of abstract features. For example,
∃(p starts self) abbreviates ∃(p= )  ∃(pr < r).
Intuitively, self refers to the interval associated with the domain element at which the
∃(p starts self) concept is “evaluated”.
2 It is only for simplicity that we assume temporal entities to have a unique temporal extension. In principle,
we could also allow multiple extensions, e.g., for lifetime, childhood, worktime, etc.
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Since we have intervals and points at our disposal, we should be able to talk about the
relationship between points and intervals. More precisely, there exist 5 possible relations
between a point and an interval and we introduce the following abbreviations for them:
∃(p beforep p) for ∃(pt < p′)
∃(p startsp p′) for ∃(pt = p′)
∃(p duringp p′) for ∃(p′ < pt)  ∃(pt < p′r)
∃(p finishesp p′) for ∃(pt = p′r)
∃(p afterp p′) for ∃(p′r < pt)
where p and p′ are again sequences of abstract features. We refrain from defining
abbreviations for the inverses of these relations since they can easily be expressed by
exchanging the arguments in the above abbreviations.
Now for the application of our framework in process engineering. Our goal is to
represent information about an automated chemical production process that is carried out
by some complex technical device. The device operates each day for some time, depending
on the output quantity that is to be produced. It needs complex startup and shutdown phases
before and after operation. Moreover, some weekly maintenance is needed to keep the
device functional.
Let us first represent the underlying temporal structure consisting of weeks and days.
The corresponding TBox can be found in Fig. 3. In the figure, we use C  D as an
abbreviation for  .= (C →D). The first concept equation states that each week consists
of seven days, where the ith day is accessible from the corresponding week via the abstract
feature dayi . The temporal relationship between the days are as expected: Monday starts
the week, Sunday finishes it, and each day temporally meets the succeeding one. Moreover,
each week has a successor week (accessible via the abstract feature next) that it temporally
meets. The TBox clearly implies that days 2 to 6 are during the corresponding week
although this is not explicitly stated.
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Week .= Interval
1i7
∃dayi .Day
∃(day1 starts self)  ∃(day7 finishes self)
1i<7
∃(dayi meets dayi+1)
∃next.Week  ∃(self meets next)
Day Interval
Fig. 3. Weeks and days.
Day ∃start.Startup  ∃op.Operation  ∃shut.Shutdown
∃(start ◦  )
∃(start meets op)
∃(op meets shut)
∃(shut ◦ r  r)
Week  ∃maint.Maintenance  ∃(self contains maint)
Interval  Startup unionsqOperation unionsq Shutdown unionsqMaintenance
Fig. 4. Operation and maintenance.
Fig. 4 defines the startup, operation, shutdown, and maintenance phases, where start,
op, shut, and maint are abstract features and “◦” is used as a separator for features that
are used in sequences for better readability. In lines 2 to 5 of the concept equation for
Day, we freely combine abbreviations from the framework with predicates from T DL to
obtain succinct definitions. Taken together, these lines imply that phases are related to the
corresponding day as follows: startup via starts or during, shutdown via during or finishes,
and operation via during. Moreover, the startup phase meets the operation phase, which in
turn meets the shutdown phase.
Until now, we did not say anything about the temporal relationship of maintenance
and operation. This may be inadequate, if, for example, maintenance and operation are
mutually exclusive. We can take this into account by using the additional concept equation
Week 
1i7
(∃(maint before dayi ◦ op) unionsq ∃(maint after dayi ◦ op)) (∗)
which expresses that the weekly maintenance phase must be either before or after the
operation phase of every weekday. It is not hard to check that this is the case if and
only if the weekly maintenance phase is strictly separated from the operation phase of
any weekday.
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This finishes the modeling of the basic properties of our production process. Let us
define some more advanced concepts to illustrate reasoning with T DL. For example, we
can define a busy week as follows:
BusyWeek .=Week 
1i7
(∃(dayi ◦ start starts dayi )
∃(dayi ◦ shut finishes dayi )
)
.
The concept equation says that on every day of a busy week, the startup phase starts at the
beginning of the day and the shutdown finishes at the end of the day. Say now that it is
risky to do maintenance during startup and shutdown phases and define
RiskyWeek .=Week¬ 
1i7
(∃(dayi ◦ start before maint)unionsq
∃(dayi ◦ shut after maint)
)
expressing that, in a risky week, the maintenance phase is not strictly separated from the
startup and shutdown phases. If T is the TBox obtained by taking the concept equations
from Figs. 1, 3, and 4, then a T DL reasoner can be used to deduce that BusyWeek T
RiskyWeek, i.e., every busy week is a risky week: in a busy week, every day of the week
is partitioned into startup, shutdown, and operation phases. Since maintenance may not
overlap with operation phases by (∗), it must overlap with startup and/or shutdown phases,
which means that the week is a risky week.
In order to demonstrate combined reasoning with time points and intervals, we propose
a further refinement of our model. Assume that the production process is fully automated
except that an operator interaction is necessary to initiate the startup and shutdown phases.
This is described by the concept equations in Fig. 5, where up-int and down-int are abstract
features. Note that the operator interaction is represented by a time point instead of a time
interval. To illustrate reasoning, assume that, on Friday of calendar week 23, a shutdown
interaction was performed by the maintenance team:
Week23Week ∃(day5 ◦ down-int duringp maint).
It is not hard to see that this is inconsistent with the description of faultless operation from
above, i.e., that Week23 is unsatisfiable: the shutdown interaction finishes the operation
phase (since it starts the shutdown phase and the operation phase meets the shutdown
phase), which means that the maintenance phase, during which the shutdown interaction
was performed, is not strictly separated from the operation phase. This separateness,
however, is required by (∗) since maintenance and operation are mutually exclusive. Hence,
Day  ∃up-int.Interaction  ∃down-int.Interaction
∃(up-int startsp start)
∃(down-int startsp shut)
Interaction  Point
Fig. 5. Operator interaction.
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unsatisfiability of Week23 allows us to conclude that something went wrong on the Friday
of calendar week 23.
It should be obvious how to extend the proposed framework to ABoxes and ABox
reasoning. Details are left to the reader.
4. The concept satisfiability algorithm
In this section, we prove the satisfiability of T DL-concepts w.r.t. TBoxes to be
decidable and obtain a tight EXPTIME complexity bound for this reasoning task. By
the reduction given in Section 2, we obtain EXPTIME-completeness of T DL-concept
subsumption w.r.t. TBoxes as well. The upper bound is established using an automata-
theoretic approach: first, models are abstracted to so-called Hintikka-trees such that there
exists a model for a concept C and a TBox T iff there exists a Hintikka-tree for C and T .
Then we build, for each T DL-concept C and TBox T , a looping tree automaton AC,T
(i.e., a Büchi tree automaton where every run is accepting) that accepts exactly the
Hintikka-trees for C and T . Hence, AC,T accepts the empty (tree-) language iff C is
unsatisfiable w.r.t. T . Since the translation produces at most an exponential blow-up in
size and the emptiness-test for looping automata can be performed in polynomial time, we
obtain the announced EXPTIME upper bound.
Throughout this section, we assume that T DL-concepts and TBoxes contain only the
predicates < and =. It is easy to see that this can be done without loss of generality since
other predicates can be eliminated by exhaustively applying the following rewrite rules:
∃(u1  u2)❀ ∃(u1 < u2) unionsq ∃(u1 = u2),
∃(u1  u2)❀ ∃(u1 > u2) unionsq ∃(u1 = u2),
∃(u1 = u2)❀ ∃(u1 > u2) unionsq ∃(u1 < u2).
For devising a satisfiability algorithm, it is interesting to note that T DL with general
TBoxes lacks the finite model property since there exist satisfiable TBoxes such as  .=
∃(g < fg) having only infinite models (due to the semantics of the “<” predicate). Hence,
Hintikka-trees and most other structures used for deciding satisfiability are (potentially)
infinite.
4.1. Preliminaries
We introduce the basic notions needed for the automata-theoretic satisfiability algorithm
like infinite trees, looping automata, and the language they accept. We also introduce
constraint graphs which will be needed to take into account temporal information when
defining Hintikka trees.
Definition 6 (Looping automaton). Let M be a set and k  1. A k-ary M-tree is a mapping
T : {1, . . . , k}∗ →M that labels each node α ∈ {1, . . . , k}∗ with T (α) ∈M . Intuitively, the
node αi is the ith child of α. We use ε to denote the empty word (corresponding to the root
of the tree).
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A looping automaton A = (Q,M, I,∆) for k-ary M-trees is defined by a finite set Q
of states, a finite alphabet M , a subset I ⊆ Q of initial states, and a transition relation
∆⊆Q×M ×Qk .
A run of A on an M-tree T is a mapping r : {1, . . . , k}∗ →Q with r(ε) ∈ I and(
r(α), T (α), r(α1), . . . , r(αk)
) ∈∆
for each α ∈ {1, . . . , k}∗. A looping automaton accepts all those M-trees for which there
exists a run, i.e., the language L(A) of M-trees accepted by A is
L(A) := {T | there is a run of A on T }.
Vardi and Wolper [39] show that the emptiness problem for looping automata, i.e., the
problem to decide whether the language L(A) accepted by a given looping automaton A
is empty, is decidable in polynomial time.
A Hintikka-tree T for C and T corresponds to a canonical model T of C and T . Apart
from representing the abstract domain ∆I together with the interpretation of concepts and
roles, T induces a directed graph whose edges are labeled with predicates from {<,=}.
Such constraint graphs describe the “temporal part” of I , i.e., temporal successors of
elements of ∆I and their relationship by temporal predicates.
Definition 7 (Constraint graph). A constraint graph is a pair G= (V ,E), where
• V is a countable set of nodes and
• E ⊆ V ×{=,<}×V is a set of edges such that (v1,=, v2) ∈E implies (v2,=, v1) ∈E.
A constraint graph G= (V ,E) is called satisfiable iff there exists a total mapping δ from
V toQ such that δ(v1)P δ(v2) for all (v1,P, v2) ∈E. Such a mapping δ is called a solution
for G.
Let G= (V ,E) be a constraint graph. A sequence of nodes v0, . . . , vk ∈ V is called a
cycle in G if, for all i  k, we have (vi ,P, v(i+1) mod k) ∈E for some P ∈ {<,=}. A cycle
v0, . . . , vk is called a <-cycle if there is an i  k with (vi ,<,v(i+1) mod k) ∈E.
The following theorem will be crucial for proving that, for every Hintikka-tree, there
exists a corresponding canonical model. More precisely, it will be used to ensure that
the constraint graph induced by a Hintikka-tree, which describes the temporal part of the
corresponding model, is satisfiable. The proof can be found in Appendix A.
Theorem 8. A constraint graph is satisfiable iff it does not contain a <-cycle.
Note that we use the rational numbers Q in the semantics of T DL, and thus also for
interpreting constraint graphs. All obtained results also apply if we choose R instead: the
proof of Theorem 8 may remain unchanged and, intuitively, T DL does not “feel” the
difference between Q and R. However, it is interesting to note that Theorem 8 does not
hold if satisfiability over non-dense structures such as N is considered: if there exist two
nodes v1 and v2 such that the length of <-paths (which are defined in analogy to <-cycles)
between v1 and v2 is unbounded, then a constraint graph is unsatisfiable over N even if it
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contains no <-cycle. Fig. 6 shows such a constraint graph. And indeed, T DL does feel the
difference between N and dense structures such as Q and R: the concept  is satisfiable
w.r.t. the TBox
T = { ∃(g1 < g2)  ∃(g1 < fg1)  ∃(fg2 < g2)}
over the temporal structures Q and R, but not over N. Note that T enforces the constraint
graph in Fig. 6.
4.2. Path normal form
Apart from the assumption that only the predicates < and = occur in concepts and
TBoxes, we require some more normalization as a prerequisite for the satisfiability
algorithm. More specifically, we assume concepts and TBoxes to be in negation normal
form (NNF) and, more importantly, restrict the length of paths, which will turn out to
be rather convenient for some constructions like defining Hintikka-trees. We start with
describing NNF conversion. A concept is said to be in negation normal form if negation
occurs only in front of concept names. The following lemma shows that assuming NNF is
not a restriction.
Lemma 9 (NNF conversion). Exhaustive application of the following rewrite rules
translates T DL-concepts to equivalent ones in NNF.
¬¬C❀ C
¬(C D)❀¬C unionsq¬D ¬(C unionsqD)❀¬C ¬D
¬(∃R.C)❀ (∀R.¬C) ¬(∀R.C)❀ (∃R.¬C)
¬∃(u1P u2)❀ ∃(u1P˜ u2) unionsq ∃(u2 < u1) unionsq u1↑ unionsq u2↑ ¬(g↑)❀ ∃(g = g)
where ·˜ denotes the exchange of predicates, i.e., <˜ is = and =˜ is <. By nnf(C), we denote
the result of converting C into NNF using the above rules.
We now introduce path normal form for T DL-concepts and TBoxes.
Definition 10 (Path normal form). A T DL-concept C is in path normal form (PNF) iff it
is in NNF and, for all subconcepts ∃(u1 P u2) of C, we have either
(1) u1 = g1 and u2 = g2 for some g1, g2 ∈ NtF,
(2) u1 = fg1 and u2 = g2 for some f ∈ NaF and g1, g2 ∈ NtF, or
(3) u1 = g1 and u2 = fg2 for some f ∈ NaF and g1, g2 ∈ NtF.
A T DL-TBox T is in path normal form iff all concepts in T are in PNF.
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The following lemma shows that it is not a restriction to consider only concepts and
TBoxes in PNF.
Lemma 11. Satisfiability of T DL-concepts w.r.t. TBoxes can be reduced in polynomial
time to satisfiability of T DL-concepts in PNF w.r.t. TBoxes in PNF.
Proof. Let C be a T DL-concept. For every path u= f1 · · ·fng used in C, we assume that
[g], [fng], . . . , [f1 · · ·fng] are temporal features not used in C. We inductively define a
mapping λ from paths u in C to concepts as follows:
λ(g)=,
λ(f u)= ∃([f u] = f [u])  ∃f.λ(u).
For every T DL-concept C, a corresponding concept ρ(C) is obtained by replacing all
subconcepts ∃(u1P u2) of C with ∃([u1]P [u2])  λ(u1)  λ(u2) and g↑ with [g]↑. We
extend the mapping ρ to TBoxes in the obvious way, i.e., if
T = {C1 D1, . . . ,Ck Dk},
then
ρ(T )= {ρ(C1) ρ(D1), . . . , ρ(Ck) ρ(Dk)}.
Now let C be a T DL-concept and T a T DL-TBox. Using the rewrite rules from Lemma 9,
we can convert C into an equivalent concept C′ in NNF and T into an equivalent TBox T ′
in NNF. It is then easy to check that C′ is satisfiable w.r.t. a TBox T ′ iff ρ(C′) is satisfiable
w.r.t. ρ(T ′). Moreover, ρ(C′) and ρ(T ′) are clearly in PNF and the translation can be done
in polynomial time. ✷
In what follows, we generally assume that all concepts and TBoxes are in path normal
form. Moreover, we will often refer to TBoxes T in their concept form CT which is defined
as follows:
CT = 
C
.=D∈T
nnf(C↔D).
4.3. Defining Hintikka-trees
In this section, we define Hintikka-trees for T DL-concepts C and TBoxes T (which
are both required to be in PNF) and show that Hintikka-trees are proper abstractions of
models, i.e., that there exists a Hintikka-tree for C and T iff there exists a model of C
and T .
Let C be a concept and T be a TBox. By sub(C,T ), we denote the set of subconcepts
of C and CT . We assume that existential concepts ∃R.D ∈ sub(C,T ) with R ∈ NrR
are linearly ordered, and that Ei (C,T ) yields the ith such concept (starting with i = 1).
Similarly, we assume the abstract features used in C or T to be linearly ordered and use
Fi (C,T ) to denote the ith such feature (also starting with i = 1). The set of temporal
features used in C or T is denoted by G(C,T ).
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We now define Hintikka-pairs which will be used as labels of nodes in Hintikka-trees.Definition 12 (Hintikka-set, Hintikka-pair). Let C be a concept and T a TBox. A set
Ψ ⊆ sub(C,T ) is a Hintikka-set for C and T the following conditions:
(H1) CT ∈Ψ ,
(H2) if C1 C2 ∈Ψ , then {C1,C2} ⊆ Ψ ,
(H3) if C1 unionsqC2 ∈Ψ , then {C1,C2} ∩Ψ = ∅,
(H4) {A,¬A} ⊆ Ψ for all concept names A ∈ sub(C,T ),
(H5) g↑ ∈Ψ implies ∃(u1P u2) /∈ Ψ for all concepts ∃(u1P u2) with g ∈ {u1, u2}.
A Hintikka-pair (Ψ,χ) for C and T consists of a Hintikka-set Ψ for C and T and a set χ
of tuples (g1,P,g2) with g1, g2 ∈ G(C,T ) such that
(H6) if (g1,P,g2) ∈ χ , then {g1↑, g2↑} ∩Ψ = ∅.
By ΓC,T , we denote the set of all Hintikka-pairs for C and T .
We say that an abstract feature f ∈ NaF is enforced by a Hintikka-pair (Ψ,χ) if
∃f.C ∈ Ψ for some concept C or {∃(fg1P g2),∃(g1P fg2)} ∩ Ψ = ∅ for some g1, g2 ∈
NtF and P ∈ {<,=}. Similarly, a path u is enforced by (Ψ,χ) if u appears in χ or
{∃(uP u′),∃(u′P u)} ∩Ψ = ∅ for some path u′ and P ∈ {<,=}.
Observe that, if a path u is enforced by a Hintikka-pair (Ψ,χ), then u has length 1 or 2:
if u appears in χ , it has length 1 by definition; moreover, if {∃(uP u′),∃(u′P u)} ∩Ψ = ∅
for some u′ and P , then u has length 1 or 2 since all concepts are in path normal form.
Intuitively, each node α of a (yet to be defined) Hintikka-tree T corresponds to a
domain element d of the corresponding canonical model I . The first component Ψα of the
Hintikka-pair labeling α is the set of concepts from sub(C,T ) satisfied by d . The second
component χα states relationships between temporal successors of d . If, for example,
(g1,<,g2) ∈ χα , then d must have g1- and g2-successors such that gI1 (d) < gI2 (d). Note
that the restrictions in χα are independent from concepts ∃(g1P g2) ∈ Ψα , but rather
describe “additional edges”. As will be discussed below, these additional edges are used
to ensure that the constraint graph induced by the Hintikka-tree T , which describes the
temporal part of the model I , does not contain a <-cycle (i.e., that it is satisfiable). This
induced constraint graph can be thought of as being the union of smaller constraint graphs,
each one described by a Hintikka-pair labeling a node in T . These pair-graphs are defined
next.
Definition 13 (Pair-graph). Let C be a concept, T a TBox, and p = (Ψ,χ) a Hintikka-pair
for C and T . The pair-graph G(p)= (V ,E) of p is a constraint graph defined as follows:
• V is the set of paths enforced by p,
• E = cl=(χ ∪ {(u1,P,u2) | ∃(u1P u2) ∈Ψ }),
where cl= is equality closure, i.e., cl=(E)=E ∪ {(v2,=, v1) | (v1,=, v2) ∈E}.
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A set E′ ⊆ V × V × {<,=} is an edge extension of G(p) if, for all fg1, fg2 ∈ V ,
we have (fg1,<,fg2) ∈ E′, (fg1,=, fg2) ∈ E′, or (fg2,<,fg1) ∈E′. If E′ is an edge
extension of G(p), then the graph (V ,E ∪E′) is a completion of G(p).
Observe that, since all concepts are in path normal form and since no paths of length
greater than one may appear in χ , we have E′ ∩ E = ∅ for every edge extension E′ of
pair-graphs (V ,E).
There exists a close connection between completions of pair-graphs and the χ -
component of Hintikka-pairs. Let α and β be nodes in a Hintikka-tree T representing
domain elements d and e in the corresponding canonical model I . Edges in Hintikka-
trees represent role-relationships, i.e., if β is a successor of α in T , then there exists an
R ∈ NR such that (d, e) ∈ RI . Assume β is a successor of α and the edge between α and β
represents relationship via the abstract feature f , i.e., we have f I(d)= e. The purpose of
the second component χβ of the Hintikka-pair labeling β is to fix the relationships between
all temporal successors of e that “d talks about”. For example, if ∃(fg1 = g2) ∈ Ψα and
∃(fg3 < g2) ∈ Ψα , where Ψα is the first component of the Hintikka-pair labeling α, then
“d talks about” the temporal g1-successor and the temporal g3-successor of e. Hence,
χβ contains (g1,<,g3), (g1,=, g3), or (g3,<,g1). This is formalized by demanding that
the pair-graph G(T (α)) of the Hintikka-pair labeling α together with all the edges from
the χ -components of the successors of α are a completion of G(T (α)). An appropriate
way of thinking about the χ -components is as follows: at α, a completion of G(T (α)) is
“guessed”. The additional edges are then “recorded” in the χ -components of the successor-
nodes of α. As will be explained after the definition of Hintikka-trees, the purpose of all this
is to achieve a “localized” detection of <-cycles in constraint-graphs induced by Hintikka-
trees.
Definition 14 (Hintikka-tree). Let C be a concept, T a TBox, k the number of
existential subconcepts in sub(C,T ), and  the number of abstract features in sub(C,T ).
A (k+ + 1)-tuple of Hintikka-pairs (p0, . . . , pk+) with pi = (Ψi,χi) and G(p0) =
(V ,E) is called matching iff
(H7) if ∃R.D ∈ Ψ0 and Ei (C,T )= ∃R.D, then D ∈ Ψi ,
(H8) if {∃R.D,∀R.E} ⊆ Ψ0 and Ei (C,T )= ∃R.D, then E ∈Ψi ,
(H9) if ∃f.D ∈ Ψ0 and Fi (C,T )= f , then D ∈Ψk+i ,
(H10) if f is enforced by p0, Fi (C,T )= f , and ∀f.D ∈ Ψ0, then D ∈ Ψk+i ,
(H11) the constraint graph (V ,E ∪E′) with
E′ =
⋃
1i
{
(fg1,P,fg2) |Fi (C,T )= f and (g1,P,g2) ∈ χk+i
}
is a satisfiable completion of G(p0).
A (k + )-ary ΓC,T tree T is a Hintikka-tree for C and T iff it satisfies the following
conditions:
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(H12) C ∈ Ψε , where T (ε)= (Ψε,χε),
(H13) for all α ∈ {1, . . . , k + }∗, the tuple (T (α), T (α1), . . . , T (αj)) is matching, where
j abbreviates k + .
For a Hintikka-tree T and a node α ∈ {1, . . . , k+}∗ with T (α)= (Ψ,χ), we use T✁(α) to
denote Ψ and T✄(α) to denote χ . Moreover, if G(α)= (V ,E), we use cpl(T ,α) to denote
the constraint graph (V ,E ∪E′) as defined in (H11).
Whereas most properties of Hintikka-trees deal with concepts, roles, and abstract
features and are hardly surprising, (H11) ensures that constraint graphs induced by
Hintikka-trees contain no <-cycle. By “guessing” a completion as explained above,
possible <-cycles are anticipated and can be detected locally, i.e., it then suffices to check
that the completions cpl(T ,α) are satisfiable as demanded by (H11). An example for such
a localization can be found in Fig. 7. The figure shows a non-local <-cycle (displayed
as dashed edges) in the constraint graph induced by a Hintikka-tree T (displayed as
thickened solid edges). Assume for a moment that the dotted edges are not present, i.e.,
the relationship between the g-successor and the g′-successor of β is unknown. Then the
constraint graphs cpl(T ,α), cpl(T ,β), and cpl(T , γ ) are all satisfiable if considered in
isolation. Since (H11) indeed considers isolated graphs, the <-cycle cannot be detected.
The problem is overcome as follows: let G(T (α))= (V ,E). Since (V ,E ∪E′) with
E′ = {(fg1,P,fg2) | (g1,P,g2) ∈ T✄(β)}
is required to be a completion of (V ,E), we must have (g,<,g′) ∈ T✄(β), (g,=, g′) ∈
T✄(β), or (g′,<,g) ∈ T✄(β). In the first two cases, we obtain the lower dotted edge and
cpl(T ,α) contains a <-cycle. In the third case, we obtain the upper dotted edge. Then we
can repeat the whole process with α replaced by β and β replaced by γ such that, finally,
either cpl(T ,β) or cpl(T , γ ) contains a <-cycle. Thus, the non-local <-cycle is broken
down into smaller ones by “guessing” additional edges. The smaller <-cycles can then be
detected by (H11). Indeed, it is crucial that (H11) is a local condition since we need to
Fig. 7. Localized cycle detection.
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define an automaton that accepts exactly Hintikka-trees, and automata work locally. It is
worth noting that the localization of cycle detection as described above crucially depends
on the path normal form.
The following lemma shows that Hintikka-trees are appropriate abstractions of models.
This result is the main step towards devising a decision procedure since, as we shall see
next, defining looping automata accepting exactly the Hintikka-trees for a given conceptC
and TBox T is a straightforward task. The proof can be found in Appendix A.
Lemma 15. A concept C is satisfiable w.r.t. a TBox T iff there exists a Hintikka-tree for C
and T .
4.4. Defining looping automata
To prove decidability of T DL-concept satisfiability w.r.t. TBoxes, it remains to define a
looping automaton AC,T for each concept C and TBox T such that AC,T accepts exactly
the Hintikka-trees for C and T . Using the notion of matching tuples of Hintikka-pairs from
Definition 14, this is rather straightforward.
Definition 16. Let C be a concept, T a TBox, k the number of existential subconcepts in
sub(C,T ), and  the number of abstract features in sub(C,T ). The looping automaton
AC,T = (Q,M,∆, I) is defined as follows:
• Q :=M := ΓC,T ,
• I := {(Ψ,χ) ∈Q | C ∈ Ψ },
• ((Ψ,χ), (Ψ ′, χ ′), (Ψ1, χ1), . . . , (Ψk+,χk+)) ∈ ∆ iff (Ψ,χ) = (Ψ ′, χ ′) and ((Ψ,χ),
(Ψ1, χ1), . . . , (Ψk+,χk+)) is matching.
As a consequence of the following lemma and Lemmas 15, we can reduce satisfiability
of concepts w.r.t. TBoxes (both in PNF) to the emptiness of the language accepted by
looping automata.
Lemma 17. T is a Hintikka-tree for C and T iff T ∈L(AC,T ).
Proof. Let C be a concept, T a TBox, and k, , and AC,T as in Definition 16. For the “if”
direction, let r be a run of AC,T on T . By definition of runs and of ∆, we have
r(α)= T (α) for all α ∈ {1, . . . , k + }∗.
Hence, it remains to be shown that r is a Hintikka-tree for C and T , which is
straightforward: (i) by definition of Q, r is a ΓC,T -tree; (ii) since, by definition of runs,
r(ε) ∈ I , (H12) is satisfied; and (iii) by definition of runs and of ∆, (H13) is satisfied.
Now for the “only if” direction. It is straightforward to check that the function r defined
by r(α) := T (α) is a run of AC,T on T : (i) by definition of Hintikka-trees and AC,T ,
r(α) ∈Q for all α ∈ {1, . . . , k + }∗; (ii) by (H12) and definition of I , we have r(ε) ∈ I ;
(iii) by (H13) and by definition of r and of ∆, we have (r(α), T (α), r(α1), . . . , r(αk)) ∈∆
for all α ∈ {1, . . . , k + }∗. ✷
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It is an immediate consequence of Lemmas 11, 15, and 17 and the decidability of
the emptiness problem of looping automata [39] that satisfiability of T DL-concepts
w.r.t. TBoxes is decidable. However, the presented automata-based algorithm has the nice
property of additionally providing us with a tight complexity bound. In the following, we
use |C| to denote the length of the concept C and T to denote ∑D .=E∈T |D| + |E|.
Theorem 18. Satisfiability of T DL-concepts w.r.t. general TBoxes is EXPTIME-complete.
Proof. The lower bound is an immediate consequence of the fact thatALC with TBoxes is
EXPTIME-hard [32]. Hence, we may concentrate on the upper bound. We need to show that
the size of A(C,T ) is exponential in |C| + |T | since, once that this is established, we can
use Lemmas 11, 15, and 17 together with the fact that the emptiness problem for looping
automata A(C,T ) is in PTIME [39] to conclude that satisfiability of T DL-concepts w.r.t.
TBoxes can be decided in deterministic exponential time. Hence, let us investigate the size
of A(C,T ) = (Q,M,∆, I). Obviously, the cardinality of sub(C,T ) is linear in |C| + |T |.
Hence, by definition of A(C,T ) and Hintikka-pairs, the cardinality of Q, M , and I are
exponential in |C| + |T |. Together with the fact that ∆ contains (k + )-tuples and k + 
is polynomial in |C| + |T |, the exponential bound on the cardinality of Q implies that the
cardinality of ∆ is also exponential in |C| + |T |. ✷
Since subsumption can be reduced to (un)satisfiability, T DL-concept subsumption
w.r.t. TBoxes is also EXPTIME-complete.
5. Deciding ABox consistency
In this section, we extend the EXPTIME upper bound just obtained to T DL-ABox
consistency w.r.t. TBoxes. The extended upper bound is established using a so-called
precompletion algorithm [10,16]. The idea behind such algorithms is to proceed in two
stages: first, a set of completion rules is exhaustively applied to the input ABox in order
to make implicit information explicit. If an obvious contradiction is encountered during
this process, then the input ABox is inconsistent and the second stage is not needed. If no
contradiction is found, in the second stage we construct a reduction concept Ca for each
object name a of the obtained ABox and check it for satisfiability w.r.t. the input TBox
using the algorithm developed in the previous section. Then, the input ABox is satisfiable
w.r.t. the input TBox if and only if all reduction concepts are satisfiable.
As in the previous section, we assume w.l.o.g. that all concepts (also inside TBoxes and
ABoxes) contain only the predicates < and =. Moreover, we require TBoxes and ABoxes
to be in path normal form, where an ABox A is in PNF iff every concept occurring in A is
in PNF. The next lemma shows that this assumption does not sacrifice generality.
Lemma 19. Consistency of T DL-ABoxes w.r.t. TBoxes can be reduced to consistency of
T DL-ABoxes in PNF w.r.t. TBoxes in PNF.
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Proof. Let A be an ABox and T a TBox, and let k be the length of the longest path
occurring in A or T . For every path u = f1 · · ·fng used in A or T , we assume that
[g], [fng], . . . , [f1 · · ·fng] are temporal features not appearing in A or T . Let ρ be the
mapping from concepts to concepts in PNF and from TBoxes to TBoxes in PNF introduced
in the proof of Lemma 11. Construct an ABox ρ(A) from A by performing the following
steps:
(1) Replace every assertion a :C ∈A with a : ρ(C);
(2) Replace every assertion 〈a, x〉 : g ∈A with 〈a, x〉 : [g];
(3) For i = 1, . . . , k − 1 do the following: for every pair of assertions
〈a, b〉 : f, 〈b, x〉 : [u] ∈A
where the length of u is i and fu is a postfix of a path occurring in A or T , add
〈a, x〉 : [fu] to A.
It is straightforward to prove thatA is satisfiable w.r.t. T iff ρ(A) is satisfiable w.r.t. ρ(T ).
Moreover, the size of ρ(A) and ρ(T ) is polynomial in n= |A| + |T | and ρ(A) and ρ(T )
can be constructed in polynomial time. While ρ(T ) was treated in the proof of Lemma 11,
for ρ(A) this can be seen as follows. Since the number of postfixes of paths occurring in A
and T is bounded by n, the number of object names and time point names in A is also
bounded by n, and no new object names are introduced, the number of assertions of the
form 〈a, x〉 : [u] generated in step (3) is bounded by n3. Since the number of assertions
〈a, b〉 : f is bounded by n, the number of pairs to be considered in each step of the “for”
loop in step (3) is thus bounded by n4. Since we clearly have k  n, ρ(A) can be computed
in time n5. ✷
The completion rules can be found in Fig. 8. In the formulation of the rules, we write
A(a) for {C | a : C ∈ A} and call a time point name x ∈ Ot fresh in an ABox A if
x does not occur in A. Note that the rules Runionsq and Rch yield more than one possible
outcome. Intuitively, the precompletion algorithm has to explore all possible outcomes—
more details are given later on. Note that we cannot use the usual non-deterministic
“guessing” here since we are heading for a deterministic time bound.
While the rules R, Runionsq, R∀, and R .= are straightforward, the other rules deserve some
comments. The R∃f rule deals with concepts ∃f.C, where f ∈ NaF. Since it is our goal to
make explicit information for existing object names rather than generating new ones, this
rule only applies to a concept ∃f.C ∈A(a) if the object a already has an f -successor (i.e.,
an object name b with 〈a, b〉 : R ∈A). For the same reason, concepts ∃R.C with R ∈ NrR
are not expanded at all, but rather “treated” as part of the reduction concepts. The rules Rc1,
Rc2 and Rc3 deal with concepts ∃(u1P u2): there exists one rule for each syntactic form
that PNF allows. Observe that Rc2 and Rc3 generate new time point names, but, similar
to the R∃f rule, none of the Rc rules generates new object names even if the paths u1 and
u2 involve abstract features. Intuitively, if ∃(fg1P g2) ∈A(a) and a has no f -successor,
then it suffices to treat the concept ∃(fg1P g2) in the reduction concept. The Rch rule has
the character of a “choose rule” (cf. for example [17]) and is needed to ensure that the
relation between any two temporal successors of an object a is recorded as a concept of the
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R if C1 C2 ∈A(a) and {C1,C2} ⊆A(a)
then A :=A∪ {a :C1, a :C2}
Runionsq if C1 unionsqC2 ∈A(a) and {C1,C2} ∩A(a)= ∅
then A1 :=A∪ {a :C1} and A2 :=A∪ {a :C2}
R∃f if ∃f.C ∈A(a), 〈a, b〉 : f ∈A, and C /∈A(b)
then set A :=A∪ {b :C}
R∀ if ∀R.C ∈A(a), 〈a, b〉 :R ∈A, and C /∈A(b)
then set A :=A∪ {b :C}
Rc1 if ∃(g1P g2) ∈A(a), {〈a, x1〉 : g1, 〈a, x2〉 : g2} ⊆A,
and x1P x2 /∈A
then set A :=A∪ {x1P x2}
Rc2 if ∃(fg1P g2) ∈A(a), 〈a, b〉 : f ∈A, and there are no x1, x2 ∈ Ot
such that {〈b, x1〉 : g1, 〈a, x2〉 : g2, x1P x2} ⊆A
then set A :=A∪ {〈b, x1〉 : g1, 〈a, x2〉 : g2, x1P x2}
where x1 and x2 are fresh inA
Rc3 Symmetric to Rc2 but for concepts ∃(g1P fg2) ∈A(a)
Rch if {〈a, x1〉 : g1, 〈a, x2〉 : g2} ⊆A and
{∃(g1 < g2),∃(g1 = g2),∃(g2 < g1)} ∩A(a)= ∅
then set A1 :=A∪ {a : ∃(g1 < g2)},
A2 :=A∪ {a : ∃(g1 = g2)}, and
A3 :=A∪ {a : ∃(g2 < g1)}.
R .= if CT /∈A(a) then set A :=A∪ {a : CT }
Rfe if {〈a, b〉 : f, 〈a, c〉 : f } ⊆A and b = c
(resp. {〈a, x〉 : g, 〈a, y〉 : g} ⊆A and x = y)
then replace b by c in A (resp. x by y)
Fig. 8. Completion rules for T DL.
form ∃(g1P g2) in the node label of a. This is necessary since the relation between such
temporal successors must be passed to the satisfiability algorithm as part of the reduction
concept. Finally, the Rfe rule is a “fork elimination rule” (cf. for example [5,23]) that is
needed to enforce the functionality of abstract and temporal features.
If an ABox A′ can be obtained from an ABox A by exhaustive rule application using a
TBox T , then A′ is called precomplete and a precompletion of A w.r.t. T . Interleaved
with rule application, the precompletion checks for obvious contradictions. These are
formalized as follows.
Definition 20 (Clash). Let A be an ABox. A is called temporally satisfiable iff the
constraint graph G(A)= (V ,E) is satisfiable, where
• V = {x ∈ Ot | x occurs in A};
• E = {(x1,P, x2) | x1P x2 ∈A}.
A is said to contain a clash iff one of the following conditions applies:
(1) {A,¬A} ⊆A(a) for a concept name A and object name a ∈ Oa ,
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define procedure cons(A,T )
while a rule R ∈ {R,R∃f,R∀,Rc1,Rc2,Rc3,R .=,Rfe}
is applicable to A do
apply R to A
if a completion rule R ∈ {Runionsq,Rch} is applicable to A then
apply R to A yielding A1, . . . ,Ak (k ∈ {2,3})
if cons(Ai ,T )= consistent for some i ∈ {1, . . . , k} then
return consistent
return inconsistent
if A contains a clash then
return inconsistent
if sat( 
C∈A(a)C,T )= satisfiable for every a ∈ Oa in A then
return consistent
return inconsistent
Fig. 9. The T DL precompletion algorithm.
(2) g↑ ∈A(a) for some a ∈ Oa and there exists an x ∈ Ot such that 〈a, x〉 : g ∈A, or
(3) A is not temporally satisfiable.
If A does not contain a clash, then A is clash-free.
The precompletion algorithm itself is given in Fig. 9 in a pseudocode notation. In
the formulation of the algorithm, we use sat(C,T ) to denote the result of applying the
satisfiability algorithm from the previous section to the concept C and TBox T . The
general idea behind the algorithm and the correctness proofs is that models of the reduction
concepts can be “plugged together” to form a model of the input ABox.
We now prove termination and investigate the time complexity of the algorithm. In order
to do this, we need a size function for ABoxes. To this end, set
|a : C| := C,
|〈a, b〉 :R| := |〈a, x〉 : g| := |x1P x2| := 2
and |A| :=∑α∈A |α|. First, we establish an upper bound for the number of rules that may
be applied to a given ABox.
Lemma 21. Let A be an ABox, T a TBox, and A0, . . . ,Ak with A0 = A a sequence of
ABoxes obtained by repeated rule application. Then k  p(|A| + |T |) for some polynomial
p(n).
Proof. We abbreviate |A| + |T | by n. Each of the rules R, Runionsq, R∃f, R∀, Rch, and R .=
adds a new concept to the label of an object name. Since all added concepts are from the set
χ := sub(A,T )∪ {∃(g1P g2) | P ∈ {<,=} and g1, g2 used in sub(A,T )}
and |χ | 2n2 + n, the number of applications of the above rules per object name is also
bounded by 2n2 + n and their overall number of applications is bounded by 2n3 + n2.
There are four remaining rules:
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• Rc1, Rc2, Rc3. These rules are applied at most once per concept ∃(u1P u2) ∈ χ and
object name a in A. Since no new object names are introduced, there are at most
2n3 + n2 applications of Rc1, Rc2 and Rc3. Moreover, since each rule application
introduces at most 2 new time point names and Rc2 and Rc3 are the only rules to
introduce new time point names, it also follows that the number of newly introduced
time point names is bounded by 4n3 + 2n2.
• Rfe. The rule is applied at most once per object and time point name. The initial ABox
contains at most n object and time point names, no new object names are generated,
and at most 4n3 + 2n2 new time point names are generated. Hence, the number of
applications of Rfe is bounded by 4n3 + 2n2 + n.
Taking together these observations, it is obvious that there exists a polynomial p(n) as
required. ✷
We can now prove termination.
Proposition 22 (Termination). If started on an ABox A and a TBox T , the precompletion
algorithm terminates after time exponential in |A| + |T |.
Proof. Assume that the precompletion algorithm is started on an ABox A and a TBox
T . The precompletion algorithm is a recursive procedure. In every recursion step, either
several recursion calls or several calls to the sat algorithm are made. Obviously, a run of the
algorithm induces a recursion tree, where nodes in the tree are recursion steps and edges
are recursion calls. These recursion trees have the following properties:
(1) Since at most three recursion calls are made per recursion step, the out-degree is three.
(2) Every path of the recursion tree induces a sequence of ABoxes A0,A1, . . . with
A0 =A that can be obtained by repeated rule application. By Lemma 21, the length
of this sequence is bounded by p(|A| + |T |), and, thus, the depth of recursion trees is
also bounded by p(|A| + |T |).
This implies that the total number of recursion steps made by the algorithm is bounded by
3p(|A|+|T |). Since none of the rules introduces new object names, the number of sat calls
per recursion step is bounded by |A| and the total number of calls to sat by 3p(|A|+|T |) · |A|.
Together with Theorem 18, we obtain termination and the exponential time bound. ✷
We now establish a series of lemmas that will finally allow to establish soundness and
completeness of the precompletion algorithm. The proofs of all lemmas can be found
in Appendix B. We start with showing that the construction of precompletions preserves
(in)consistency.
Lemma 23. Let A be an ABox and T a TBox. Then A is consistent w.r.t. T iff there exists
a precompletion A′ of A w.r.t. T such that A′ is consistent w.r.t. T .
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Our next aim is to show that every clash-free precomplete ABox, for which all reduction
concepts are satisfiable, is consistent. We start with a technical lemma which states that,
intuitively, for every precomplete ABox A with satisfiable reduction concepts, we can find
models for the reduction concepts such that these model’s temporal parts can be “plugged
into” solutions for the constraint graph G(A) induced by A. Recall that we use con(A, a)
to denote the reduction concept for a ∈ Oa in A.
Lemma 24. Let A be a precomplete ABox, δ a solution for G(A), and a ∈ Oa used in A.
If con(A, a) is satisfiable w.r.t. T , then there exists a model T of con(A, a) and T and a
da ∈ con(A, a)I such that, for all 〈a, x〉 : g ∈A, we have gI(da)= δ(x).
The following lemma is central for proving soundness and completeness. Its proof
follows the intuition given above: models for the reduction concepts are “plugged together”
in order to form a model for the ABox. To deal with the temporal parts of models, we relay
on Lemma 24.
Lemma 25. LetA be a precompletion of an ABox A′ w.r.t. a TBox T . A is consistent w.r.t.
T iff A is clash-free and con(A, a) is satisfiable w.r.t. T for every a ∈ Oa used in A.
Finally, we prove soundness and completeness.
Proposition 26 (Soundness and completeness). If the precompletion algorithm is started
on an ABox A and a TBox T , then it returns consistent if A is consistent w.r.t. T and
inconsistent otherwise.
Proof. Let A and T be an input to the precompletion algorithm. Since the order of rule
application is clearly irrelevant, the algorithm computes all clash-free precompletions
of A w.r.t. T . For each such precompletion A′, it checks whether the reduction
concept con(A, a) is satisfiable for all a ∈ Oa occurring in A′. It returns consistent
if it finds a precompletion for which this is true and, by Proposition 22, inconsistent
otherwise. Soundness and completeness are thus an immediate consequence of Lemmas 23
and 25. ✷
Taking together Propositions 22 and 26, we obtain an EXPTIME upper bound for T DL-
ABox consistency w.r.t. TBoxes. Together with the lower bound from Theorem 18, we
obtain the following result.
Theorem 27. T DL-ABox consistency w.r.t. general TBoxes is EXPTIME-complete.
6. Discussion
In this paper, we have introduced the description logic T DL whose distinguishing
feature is that it admits both interval-based temporal representation and general TBoxes,
while still being decidable (and EXPTIME-complete). As noted in the introduction, this
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result also shows that there exist interesting concrete domains whose combination with
general TBoxes do not lead to undecidability of reasoning. Starting from the basic
decidability results proved in the current paper, there are lots of options for promising
future research. Let us discuss a few of them.
(1) It would be interesting to enhance the expressive power of both the temporal and the
DL part of T DL. Concerning the temporal part, one could add unary predicates Pq , where
P ∈ {<,,=, =,,>} and q ∈Q. This would allow quantitative temporal representation
by referring to “concrete” time points. On the DL side, ALC can be extended by
various means of expressivity that usually appear in state-of-the-art description logics
such as inverse roles, qualifying numbers restrictions, and transitive roles. All these
extensions have been realized in the recent paper [21], where it is shown that the
popular DL SHIQ extended with a T DL-style concrete domain and the afore mentioned
unary predicates is still decidable and EXPTIME-complete. The resulting logic is called
Q-SHIQ and has found interesting applications in reasoning about conceptual database
schemas [24].
(2) The version of T DL defined in this paper uses Q as its temporal structure. As
discussed in Section 4.1, it makes a difference whether dense temporal structures such as
Q and R or non-dense structures such as N are used: there exist T DL-concepts that are
satisfiable overQ but not over N. It would thus be interesting to consider a variant of T DL
that is based on N, or even to add to the current version of T DL a unary predicate int
stating that a time point/rational number is an integer. In this case, the algorithm would,
additionally, have to detect unsatisfiable constraint graphs such as the one in Fig. 6. We
conjecture that this cannot be done without adding a non-trivial acceptance condition to our
automata model, e.g., switching from looping to Büchi automata. Using N as the temporal
structure would be useful if discreteness of time is assumed (e.g., a time point is viewed
as a reference to some particular second in time), and if the resulting logic is used in non-
temporal applications: we may, e.g., use temporal features to store the number of children
that a person has, rather than storing a time point. Clearly, fractional numbers make no
sense in this context.
(3) It would be natural to define a spatial description logic SDL by replacing the
temporal predicates of T DL with spatial ones. For example, one could use the set of eight
“topological” relations called RCC-8 [7,30], which describe all possible ways in which
two regions can be related in topological spaces, and which in many aspects resemble the
Allen relations. Our guess is that again a decidable formalism is obtained, but many proof
techniques would clearly have to be reworked. For example, the RCC-8 relations cannot
be broken down to the predicates {<,=}.
It is also interesting to note that there are certain well-known limitations for extending
the temporal part of T DL. For example, if we think of the ∃(u1P u2) constructor as a
means for talking about rational numbers rather than about temporal information, then
it seems natural to add predicates for arithmetics such as a ternary addition predicate.
However, it is shown in [26] that it suffices to add to T DL a unary predicate for
equality to zero and a binary predicate for incrementation in order to make reasoning
undecidable.
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Appendix A. Proofs for Section 4The first task is to prove Theorem 8. For the proof, it will be helpful to define the
notion of paths in constraint graphs G: a path Q in G is a finite non-empty sequence of
nodes v0, . . . , vk ∈ V such that, for all i with i < k, we have (vi ,P, vi+1) ∈ E for some
P ∈ {<,=}. A path v0, . . . , vk is a =-path iff (vi ,=, vi+1) ∈E for i < k.
Theorem 8. A constraint graph is satisfiable iff it does not contain a <-cycle.
Proof. Since the “only if” direction is trivial, we concentrate on the “if” direction. Let G
be a constraint graph not containing a <-cycle. Let ∼ be the relation on V with v1 ∼ v2 iff
v1 = v2 or there exists a =-path between v1 and v2. Since constraint graphs are assumed
to be equality closed, ∼ is an equivalence relation. For v ∈ V , we denote the equivalence
class of v w.r.t. ∼ by [v]∼. Define a new constraint graph G′ = (V ′,E′) as follows:
V ′ : = {[v]∼ | v ∈ V },
E′ : = {([v1]∼,<, [v2]∼) | ∃v′1, v′2 ∈ V such that
v′1 ∈ [v1]∼, v′2 ∈ [v2]∼, and (v′1,<,v′2) ∈E
}
.
Using the fact that G does not contain a <-cycle, it is straightforward to prove that G′ does
not contain a <-cycle. Since G′ does not contain a <-cycle, E′ induces a partial order with
domain V ′. By Szpilrajn’s Theorem, every partial order can be extended to a total order
(on the same domain) [37]. Let ≺E′ be a total order obtained in this way from the partial
order induced by E′. In the following, we show that every total order ≺ with a countable
domain D can be embedded into Q such that the ordering is preserved. This suffices to
complete the proof since it implies that there exists a total mapping δ from V to Q such
that v1 ≺E′ v2 implies δ(v1) < δ(v2). It is obvious that δ is a solution for G′ and it is
straightforward to use δ to construct a solution for G.
Let d0, d1, . . . be an enumeration of D. We use induction on this enumeration to define
a function δ from D to Q such that d1 ≺ d2 implies δ(d1) < δ(d2) for all d1, d2 ∈D.
(1) For the induction start, set δ(d0) to some r ∈Q.
(2) Assume that δ(di) is defined for all i < k. We distinguish three cases:
(a) di ≺ dk for all i < k. Since Q has no maximum, there exists an r ∈ Q such that
r > δ(di) for all i < k. Set δ(dk) := r .
(b) dk ≺ di for all i < k. Since Q has no minimum, there exists an r ∈ Q such that
r < δ(di) for all i < k. Set δ(dk) := r .
(c) Neither of the previous two cases holds. Since Q is dense, there exists an r ∈ Q
such that
max
{
δ(di) | i < k and di ≺ dk
}
< r < min
{
δ(di) | i < k and dk ≺ di
}
.
Set δ(dk) := r .
It is readily checked that δ is as required. ✷
262 C. Lutz / Artificial Intelligence 152 (2004) 235–274
Since the proof of Lemma 15 is rather involved, we treat the “if” and the “only-if”
direction in two separate lemmas. We again use the notions of paths and =-paths in
constraint graphs. Moreover, we use the following notation: if v0, . . . , vk is a path or a
cycle, we use i+O to denote (i + 1) mod k + 1, i.e., i+O denotes the index following i in the
path/cycle O . The index ·O is omitted if clear from the context.
Lemma A.1. A concept C is satisfiable w.r.t. a general TBox T if there exists a Hintikka-
tree for C and T .
Proof. Let C be a concept, T a TBox, k the number of existential subconcepts in
sub(C,T ), and  the number of abstract features in sub(C,T ). Moreover, let T be a
Hintikka-tree for C and T . We define an interpretation I = (∆I , ·I) as follows:
∆I = {1, . . . , k + }∗,
AI = {α |A ∈ T✁(α)} for all A ∈ CN,
RI = {(α,β) | β = αi, Ei (C,T )= ∃R.E for some concept E, and
∃R.E ∈ T✁(α)} for all R ∈ NrR,
f I = {(α,β) | β = αi, Fi−k(C,T )= f, and f is enforced by T (α)}
for all f ∈ NaF.
It remains to define the interpretation of temporal features, which is done as follows: we
define an (infinite) constraint graph G(T ) induced by T , show that G(T ) is satisfiable, and
define the interpretation of temporal features from a solution of G(T ). The nodes of G(T )
have the form α|u, where α is a node in T and u is a path in C or T . More precisely, G(T )
is defined as (V , cl=(E)), where
V = {α|u | α ∈ {1, . . . , k + }∗, u appears in C or T },
E =
⋃
α∈{1,...,k+}∗
{
(α|u,P,α|u′) | (u,P,u′) is an edge in cpl(T ,α)}
∪{(α|fg),=, αi|g) |Fi−k(C,T )= f, fg is a node in cpl(T ,α)}.
It is not hard to see that G(T ) really is a constraint graph, i.e., the node set of G(T ) is
countable. Next, we show the following claim:
Claim A.1. G(T ) is satisfiable.
By Theorem 8, it suffices to show that G(T ) contains no <-cycle. Assume to the
contrary that G(T ) contains a <-cycle and that O = α0|u0, . . . , αn|un is the <-cycle in
G(T ) with minimal length. Fix a t  n such that
for each i with i  n and each β ∈ {1, . . . , k + }+, we have αi = αtβ, (∗)
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i.e., there exist no αi in O such that αt is a true prefix of αi (such a t exists since
O is of finite length). Since O is a <-cycle, there exists an s  n such that we have
(αs |us,<,αs+|us+) ∈ E. We make a case distinction and derive a contradiction in either
case.
• αs = αt . Define a sequence of nodes O ′ from O by deleting all nodes αi |ui with
αi = αt . O ′ is non-empty since αs = αt . We show that O ′ is a <-cycle in G(T ), which
is a contradiction to the minimality of O . Let O ′ = α′0|u′0, . . . , α′m|u′m. By definition
of G(T ), the fact that (αs |us,<,αs+|us+) ∈E implies αs+ = αs . Since αs = αt , αs |us
and αs+|us+ are in O ′ and it remains to show that O ′ is a cycle in G(T ), i.e., for all
i m, we have (α′i |u′i , P,α′i+|u′i+) ∈E for some P ∈ {<,=}.
Let α′i |u′i and α′i+|u′i+ be nodes in O ′. If these two nodes are already neighbor nodes
in O , we are obviously done. Hence, assume that this is not the case. By construction
of O ′, this implies the existence of a path
α′i |u′i , αt |u∗1, . . . , αt |u∗x,α′i+|u′i+
in G(T ), which is at most as long as O . Since α′i = αt and α′i+ = αt , by construction
of G(T ) and by (∗), this implies that there exist β ∈ {1, . . . , k + }∗, f ∈ NaF ,
j ∈ {1, . . . , k+}, and g,g′ ∈ G(C,T ) such that the following conditions are satisfied:
(1) α′i = α′i+ = β ,(2) αt = βj and Fj−k(C,T )= f ,
(3) u′i = fg, u∗1 = g, u∗x = g′, and u′i+ = fg′, and(4) (β|fg,=, βj |g) ∈E and (β|fg′,=, βj |g′) ∈E.
By definition of G(T ) and by point 4, both fg and fg′ are nodes in cpl(T ,β) =
(V ′,E′). By definition of cpl, this implies that either
(a) (fg′,<,fg) ∈E′ or
(b) (fg,P,fg′) ∈E′ for some P ∈ {<,=}.
Together with point 1 and 3 and the definition of G(T ), (b) obviously implies
(α′i |u′i , P,α′i+|u′i+) ∈ E, and we are done. Moreover, in the following we show that
case (a) cannot occur.
Let cpl(T ,βj) = (V ′′,E′′). In case (a), we have (g′,<,g) ∈ E′′: Let G(β) =
(V ′∗,E′∗); by definition of pair-graphs and since all concepts are in path normal form,
(fg′,<,fg) ∈E′ implies (fg′,<,fg) ∈E′ \E′∗; by definition of cpl and by point 2,
this means that (g′,<,g) ∈ T✄(β). Hence, (g′,<,g) ∈ E′′. By definition of G(T )
and point 1 and 3, (g′,<,g) ∈E′′ implies that (αt |u∗x,<,αt |u∗1) ∈E. Hence, the path
αt |u∗1, . . . , αt |u∗x is a <-cycle in G(T ), which contradicts the minimality of O .• αs = αt . We first show that there exists a node αz|uz in O such that αz = αt . For
suppose that no such node exists. Then, by definition of G(T ), u0, . . . , un is a <-cycle
in cpl(T ,αt ). This is clearly a contradiction to the fact that T is a Hintikka-tree. Hence,
we may conclude the existence of an αz as above. Define a sequence of nodes O ′ from
O by deleting all nodes αi |ui with αi = αt . O ′ is non-empty since αs = αt . Moreover,
O ′ is shorter than O due to the existence of αz. We show that O ′ is a <-cycle in
G(T ), which is a contradiction to the minimality of O . Let O ′ = αt |u′0, . . . , αt |u′m.
By definition of G(T ), the fact that (αs |us,<,αs+|us+) ∈ E implies αs+ = αs = αt .
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Hence, it remains to show that O ′ is a cycle in G(T ), i.e., that, for all i m, we have
(αt |u′i , P,αt |u′i+) ∈E for some P ∈ {<,=}.
Let αt |u′i and αt |u′i+ be nodes in O ′. If these two nodes are already neighbor nodes in
O , we are obviously done. Hence, assume that this is not the case. By construction of
O ′, this implies the existence of a path
αt |u′i , α∗1 |u∗1, . . . , α∗x |u∗x,αt |u′i+
in G(T ), which is at most as long as O , such that α∗i = αt for all i with 1  i  x .
By construction of G(T ) and by (∗), this implies that there exist β ∈ {1, . . . , k + }∗,
f ∈ NaF, j ∈ {1, . . . , k + }, and g,g′ ∈ G(C,T ) such that the following conditions
are satisfied:
(1) α∗1 = α∗x = β ,
(2) αt = βj and Fj−k(C,T )= f ,
(3) u′i = g, u∗1 = fg, u∗x = fg′, and u′i+ = g′, and(4) (β|fg,=, βj |g) ∈E and (β|fg′,=, βj |g′) ∈E.
By definition of G(T ) and by point 4, both fg and fg′ are nodes in cpl(T ,β) =
(V ′,E′). By definition of cpl, this implies that either
(a) (fg′,<,fg) ∈E′ or
(b) (fg,P,fg′) ∈E′ for some P ∈ {<,=}.
Case (a) is impossible, which can be seen as follows: together with point 1 and 3 and
the definition of G(T ), (a) obviously implies (α∗x |u∗x,<,α∗1 |u∗1) ∈E. Hence, the path
α∗1 |u∗1, . . . , α∗x |u∗x is a <-cycle in G(T ) which contradicts the minimality of O .
Hence, let us assume that (b) holds. Moreover, let cpl(T ,βj) = (V ′′,E′′). We have
(g,P,g′) ∈ E′′, which can be seen as follows: let G(β) = (V ′∗,E′∗); by definition
of pair-graphs and since all concepts are in path normal form, (fg,P,fg′) ∈ E′
implies (fg,P,fg′) ∈ E′ \ E′∗; by definition of cpl and by point 2, this means that
(g,P,g′) ∈ T✄(β). Hence, (g,P,g′) ∈ E′′. By definition of G(T ) and point 1 and 3,
(g,P,g′) ∈E′′ implies that we have (αt |u′i , P,αt |u′i+) ∈E, as was to be shown.
This finishes the proof of Claim A.1. We may now define the interpretation of temporal
features. Let δ be a solution for G(T ). We set
gI = {(α, x) | g is enforced by T (α) and δ(α|g)= x} for all g ∈ NtF.
To show that there exists a d ∈∆I such that d ∈CI , we prove the following claim:
Claim A.2. D ∈ T✁(α) implies α ∈DI for all α ∈∆I and D ∈ sub(C,T ).
Proof. The claim is proved by induction on the structure of D. First for the induction start,
which splits into several subcases:
• D is a concept name. Immediate by definition of I .
• D = ¬E. Since C is in NNF, D is also in NNF. Hence, E is a concept name. By
definition of T and since T (α) is a Hintikka-set and thus satisfies (H4), we have
α ∈ (¬E)I .
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• D = ∃(u1P u2). Let G(T ) = (V ,E) and cpl(T ,α) = (V ′,E′). By definition of pair-
graphs and cpl(), we have (u1,P,u2) ∈ E′. Moreover, by definition of G(T ), we
have (α|u1,P,α|u2) ∈E. It thus remains to show that uI1 (α)= δ(α|u1), and uI2 (α)=
δ(α|u2): since δ is a solution for G(T ), this clearly implies uI1 (α)PuI2 (α).
First, assume ui = g for some g ∈ NtF. By definition of gI and since g is enforced by
T (α), we have uIi (α)= δ(α|ui) as required. Now let ui = fg with Fj−k(C,T )= f .
Since fg is a node in cpl(T ,α), we have (α|fg,=, αj |g) ∈ E. Hence, δ(αj |g) =
δ(α|fg). By definition of f I and since f is obviously enforced by T (α), we have
f I(α)= αj . By definition of cpl and of pair-graphs, fg ∈ V ′ implies that g appears in
T✄(αj): since cpl(T ,α) is both a completion of G(α) and satisfiable, fg ∈ V ′ implies
(fg,=, fg) ∈E′; due to the definition of pair graphs and since all concepts are in path
normal form, (fg,=, fg) is not an edge of G(α); hence, by definition of cpl and since
Fj−k(C,T )= f , we must have (g,=, g) ∈ T✄(αj), i.e., g appears in T✄(αj). Since
g appears in T✄(αj) and is thus enforced by T (αj), we have gI(αj) = δ(αj |g) by
definition of gI . Summing up, we obtain (fg)I (α)= δ(αj |g)= δ(α|fg).
• D = g↑. If gI(α) is defined, then g is enforced by T (α). We show that this
implies g↑ /∈ T✁(α). If g is enforced by T (α), then either (i) g appears in T✄(α)
or (ii) {∃(g P u′),∃(u′P g)} ∩T✁(α) = ∅ for some path u′ and P ∈ {<,=}. In case (i),
(H6) yields g↑ /∈ T✁(α). In case (ii), (H5) yields the same result.
For the induction step, we make a case distinction according to the topmost operator in D.
Assume D ∈ T✁(α).
• D = C1 C2 or D = C1 unionsqC2. Straightforward by (H2) and (H3) of Hintikka-sets and
by induction hypothesis.
• D = ∃R.E with R ∈ NrR. By definition of RI , we have (α,β) ∈ RI for β = αi and
Ei (C,T )= ∃R.E. By (H7), we have E ∈ T✁(β), and, by induction, β ∈EI .
• D = ∃f.E with f ∈ NaF. Hence, f is enforced by T (α). By definition of f I , we have
f I(α) = β for β = αi and Fi−k(C,T ) = f . By (H9), we have E ∈ T✁(β), and, by
induction, β ∈EI .
• D = ∀R.E with R ∈ NrR. Let (α,β) ∈ RI . By definition of RI , there exists an i
such that Ei (C,T )= ∃R.D ∈ T✁(α) and β = αi . By (H8), we have E ∈ T✁(β), and,
by induction, β ∈ EI . Since this holds independently of the choice of β , we have
α ∈ (∀R.E)I .
• D = ∀f.E with f ∈ NaF. Let f I(α) = β . By definition of f I , we have β = αi ,
Fi−k(C,T ) = f , and f is enforced by T (α). By (H10), we have E ∈ T✁(β), and,
by induction, β ∈EI .
This completes the proof of the claim. Since C ∈ T✁(ε) by (H12) and, for all α ∈∆I , we
have CT ∈ T✁(α) by (H1), it is an immediate consequence of the semantics of TBoxes and
Claim A.2 that I is a model of C w.r.t. T . ✷
Lemma A.2. A concept C is satisfiable w.r.t. a general TBox T only if there exists a
Hintikka-tree for C and T .
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Proof. LetC be a concept, T a TBox, and k and  as in the proof of Lemma A.1. Moreover,
let I be a model of C w.r.t. T , i.e., there exists a d0 ∈∆I such that d0 ∈CI and DI =EI
for all D .= E ∈ T . We inductively define a Hintikka-tree T for C and T , i.e., a (k + )-
ary ΓC,T -tree that satisfies (H12) and (H13). Along with T , we define a mapping τ from
{1, . . . , k + }∗ to ∆I in such a way that
T✁(α)= {D ∈ sub(C,T ) | τ (α) ∈DI}. (∗)
For the induction start, set
τ (ε) := d0, T✁(ε) := {D ∈ sub(C,T ) | d0 ∈DI}, and T✄(ε) := ∅.
Obviously, (∗) is satisfied. Now for the induction step. Let α ∈ {1, . . . , k+ }∗ be a word of
minimal length such that τ (α) is defined and τ (αi) is undefined for some i ∈ {1, . . . , k+}.
We make a case distinction as follows:
(1) Ei (C,T ) = ∃R.D ∈ T✁(α). By (∗), we have τ (α) ∈ (∃R.D)I . Thus, there exists
some e ∈ ∆I such that (τ (α), e) ∈ RI and e ∈DI . Set τ (αi) := e, T✁(αi) := {E ∈
sub(C,T ) | e ∈EI}, and T✄(αi) := ∅.
(2) Fi−k(C,T )= f , and f is enforced by T (α). By (∗) and the definition of “enforced”,
there exists an e ∈∆I such that f I(τ (α))= e. Set
τ (αi) := e,
T✁(αi) := {E ∈ sub(C,T ) | e ∈EI},
T✄(αi) := {(g1,P,g2) | fg1, fg2 are enforced by T (α) and gI1 (e)PgI2 (e)
}
.
(3) α, i do not match the above cases. Set τ (αi) := τ (ε) and T (αi) := T (ε).
Clearly, (∗) is satisfied after each induction step, and hence T is well-defined. Intuitively,
case 3 applies if the ith successor of α is not needed to satisfy the properties of Hintikka-
trees. In this case, the choice of τ (αi) is arbitrary: we could have defined τ (αi) as any
element of ∆I (instead of choosing τ (ε)).
We must show that T is a Hintikka-tree for C and T . From (∗) together with the
semantics of concepts and TBoxes, it is clear that T✁(α) is a Hintikka-set for C and T for
each α ∈ {1, . . . , k+ }∗. Let us show exemplarily that (H1) holds. Assume to the contrary
that there exists an α ∈ {1, . . . , k+ }∗ such that CT /∈ T✁(α). By (∗), we have τ (α) /∈ CIT .
By definition of CT , this implies the existence of D
.=E ∈ T such that τ (α) /∈ (D↔E)I ,
i.e., τ (α) ∈DI \ EI or τ (α) ∈ EI \DI . Hence, we do not have DI = EI and obtain a
contradiction to the fact that I is a model of T .
Now we show that T (α) is a Hintikka-pair for each node α, i.e., that (H6) is satisfied.
The proof is by contradiction. Assume that there exists an α ∈ {1, . . . , k + }∗ such that
(g1,P,g2) ∈ T✄(α) and gj↑ ∈ T✁(α) for j ∈ {1,2}. By definition of T✄, (g1,P,g2) ∈
T✄(α) implies that gIj (τ (α)) is defined. But from gj↑ ∈ T✁(α) and (∗), we obtain that
gIj (τ (α)) is undefined: contradiction.
It remains to show that T satisfies (H12) and (H13). The former is simple due to the
definition of T (induction start) and the fact that d0 ∈ CI . The latter amounts to showing
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that, for each α ∈ {1, . . . , k + }∗, the tuple (T (α), T (α1), . . . , T (αj)) satisfies (H7) to
(H11), where j abbreviates k + .
(H7) Let ∃R.D ∈ T✁(α) and Ei (C,T ) = ∃R.D. By definition of τ (case 1), we have
τ (αi)= e for some e ∈∆I with (τ (α), e) ∈ RI and e ∈DI . By (∗), we thus have
D ∈ T✁(αi).
(H8) Let {∃R.D,∀R.E} ⊆ T✁(α) and Ei (C,T ) = ∃R.D. By definition of τ (case 1),
we have τ (αi) = e for some e ∈ ∆I with (τ (α), e) ∈ RI . By (∗), we have
τ (α) ∈ (∀R.E)I which implies e ∈EI . By (∗), we thus have E ∈ T✁(αi).
(H9) Let ∃f.D ∈ T✁(α) and Fi (C,T )= f . Hence, f is enforced by T (α). By definition
of τ (case 2), we have τ (αj) = e for e = f I(τ (α)) and j = k + i . From ∃f.D ∈
T✁(α) and (∗), we obtain τ (α) ∈ (∃f.D)I and thus e ∈DI . Again by (∗), we get
D ∈ T✁(αj).
(H10) Let f be enforced by T (α), Fi (C,T )= f , and ∀f.D ∈ T✁(α). By definition of τ
(case 2), we have τ (αj)= e for e= f I(τ (α)) and j = k + i . From ∀f.D ∈ T✁(α)
and (∗), we obtain τ (α) ∈ (∀f.D)I and thus e ∈ DI . Again by (∗), we get
D ∈ T✁(αj).
(H11) Let G(T (α)) = (V ,E) and E′ be defined as in (H11). To prove that (H11) is
satisfied, we show that
(1) E′ is an edge extension of G(T (α)), which implies that (V ,E ∪ E′) is a
completion of G(T (α)) and
(2) (V ,E ∪E′) is satisfiable.
We first prove point 1. It needs to be shown that, for each fg1, fg2 ∈ V ,
{(fg1,<,fg2), (fg1,=, fg2), (fg2,<,fg1)}∩E′ = ∅. By definition of G(T (α)),
fg1 and fg2 are enforced by T (α). Since T✄(α) may only contain paths of length
1, we have {∃(fg1P ′u),∃(uP ′fg1)}∩T✁(α) = ∅ for some path u and P ′ ∈ {<,=}
and similarly for fg2. By (∗), this implies that f I(gI1 (τ (α))) and f I(gI2 (τ (α)))
are defined. By definition of T (case 2) and since f is obviously enforced
by T (α), we have f I(τ (α)) = τ (αi) with Fi−k(C,T ) = f . Hence, gI1 (τ (αi))
and gI2 (τ (αi)) are defined. By the semantics, we have g
I
1 (τ (αi)) < g
I
2 (τ (αi)),
gI1 (τ (αi))= gI2 (τ (αi)), or gI2 (τ (αi)) < gI1 (τ (αi)). By definition of T✄, this yields{(g1,<,g2), (g1,=, g2), (g2,<,g1)} ∩ T✄(αi) = ∅. Hence, by definition of E′ we
have {(fg1,<,fg2), (fg1,=, fg2), (fg2,<,fg1)} ∩E′ = ∅.
We now prove point 2 from above. Define a mapping δ from V to Q as follows:
δ(u) := uI(τ (α)). This mapping is well-defined, which can be seen as follows. Fix
a u ∈ V . Since u is enforced by T (α), either
(i) u occurs in T✄(α) or
(ii) {∃(uPu′),∃(u′Pu)} ∩ T✁(α) = ∅ for some path u′ and P ∈ {<,=}.
In case (i), we have u = g for some g ∈ NtF. By definition of T , there exists a
predecessor β of α in T such that α = βi , Fi−k(C,T )= f for some f ∈ NaF, and
fg is enforced by T (β). Since T✄(β) contains only paths of length 1, we have
{∃(fg P u),∃(uP fg)} ∩ T✁(β) = ∅ for some path u and P ∈ {<,=}. By (∗),
gI(f I(τ (β))) is defined. Since, by definition of T , we have f I(τ (β))) = τ (α),
gI(τ (α)) is defined. In case (ii), it follows from (∗) that uI(τ (α)) is defined.
We show that δ is a solution for (V ,E ∪E′) by distinguishing the following cases:
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(1) (u1,P,u2) ∈ E ∩ T✄(α). Then there exist g1, g2 ∈ NtF such that u1 = g1 and
u2 = g2. By definition of T✄, we have gI1 (τ (α))PgI2 (τ (α)), and thus, by
definition of δ, δ(g1)P δ(g2).
(2) (u1,P,u2) ∈ E and ∃(u1Pu2) ∈ T✁(α). Then (∗) implies that τ (α) ∈
∃(u1P u2)I . Hence, uI1 (τ (α))PuI2 (τ (α)). By definition of δ, we thus obtain
δ(u1)P δ(u2).
(3) (u1,P,u2) ∈ E′. By definition of E′, we have u1 = fg1, u2 = fg2, and
(g1,P,g2) ∈ T✄(αi) where Fk−i (C,T )= f . By definition of T✄, this yields
that fg1 and fg2 are enforced by T (α) and gI1 (τ (αi))Pg
I
2 (τ (αi)). From this
and the definition of T (case 2), it follows that f I(τ (α))= τ (αi). We conclude
δ(u1)P δ(u2).
To sum up, we have shown that (H13) holds. ✷
Appendix B. Proofs for Section 5
Lemma 23. Let A be an ABox and T a TBox. Then A is consistent w.r.t. T iff there exists
a precompletion A′ of A w.r.t. T such that A′ is consistent w.r.t. T .
Proof. Recall that A′ is a precompletion of A w.r.t. T if A′ can be obtained from
A by exhaustive rule application (using the TBox T ). By Lemma 21, exhaustive rule
application always terminates. Hence, we only need to show that, if a precompletion rule
R is applicable to an ABox A, then A is consistent w.r.t. T iff one of the outcomes A′ of
applying R to A is consistent w.r.t. T .
We make a case distinction according to the rule R. For all rules except Rfe, the “if”
direction is trivial since A⊆A′ if A′ is obtained fromA by rule application. Hence, every
model of A′ and T is clearly also a model of A and T . Thus, we concentrate on the “only
if” direction in all cases except Rfe. Assume that T is a model of A and T .
• R = R. Assume that the R rule is applied to a concept C D ∈A(a). Since T is a
model ofA, we have aI ∈ (C D)I and thus aI ∈ CI and aI ∈DI . Rule application
adds a :C and a :D to A. Thus, T is a model of the resulting ABox A′.
• R = Runionsq. Assume that the Runionsq rule is applied to a concept C unionsq D ∈ A(a). Since T
is a model of A, we have aI ∈ (C unionsq D)I and thus aI ∈ CI or aI ∈ DI . The rule
application yields ABoxes A1 = A ∪ {a : C} and A2 = A ∪ {a : D}. Thus, I is a
model of A1 or A2.
• R = R∃f. Assume that the rule is applied to a concept ∃f.C ∈A(a) adding b : C to A
for some b with 〈a, b〉 : f ∈A. Since T is a model of A, we have aI ∈ (∃f.C)I and
f I(aI)= bI . Due to the functionality of f I , this yields bI ∈CI . Thus, I is a model
of the resulting ABox A′.
• R= R∀. Similar to the previous case.
• R= Rc1. Analogous to the next case, only simpler.
• R = Rc2. Assume that the Rc2 rule is applied to a concept ∃(fg1 P g) ∈ A(a) and
a node b with 〈a, b〉 : f ∈ A. Since T is a model of A, we have aI ∈ ∃(fg1 P g)I ,
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f I(aI)= bI , and gI(bI)P gI(aI). Rule application introduces two new time point1 2
names x1 and x2 and adds {〈b, x1〉 : g1, 〈a, x2〉 : g2, x1P x2} to A. Let I ′ be obtained
from T by setting xI1 = gI1 (bI) and xI2 = gI2 (aI). Clearly, I ′ is a model of the
resulting ABox A′.
• R= Rc3. Analogous to the previous case.
• R = Rch. Assume that the Rch rule is applied to the assertions 〈a, x1〉 : g1 and
〈a, x2〉 : g2. Since T is a model of A, there exist q1, q2 ∈ Q such that xI1 = q1 and
xI2 = q2. Trivially, we have either q1 < q2, q1 = q2, or q2 < q1. We obtain three
new ABoxes by adding one of the assertions a : ∃(g1 < g2), a : ∃(g1 = g2), and
a : ∃(g2 < g1). Thus, I is a model of Ai for some i ∈ {1,2,3}.
• R= R .=. The rule application adds a :CT for some a ∈ Oa. Since T is a model of T ,
we have d ∈ CIT for every d ∈∆I . Thus, T is also a model of the resulting ABox A′.• R = Rfe. Assume that the rule is applied to assertions 〈a, b〉 : f and 〈a, c〉 : f . Since
T is a model of A, we have f I(aI)= bI = cI . Thus, I is also a model of the ABox
A′ obtained from A by replacing the object name b with c.
For this rule, we also treat the “if” direction. Hence assume that the rule has applied
to two assertions 〈a, b〉 : f and 〈a, c〉 : f in A, and let I ′ be a model of the resulting
ABox A′ that has been obtained by replacing b with c. It is easily seen that we can
construct a model I ′′ of A by setting bI = cI .
The replacement of time point names rather than object names can be treated
analogously. ✷
Lemma 24. Let A be a precomplete ABox, δ a solution for G(A), and a ∈ Oa used in A.
If con(A, a) is satisfiable w.r.t. T , then there exists a model T of con(A, a) and T and a
da ∈ con(A, a)I such that, for all 〈a, x〉 : g ∈A, we have gI(da)= δ(x).
Proof. LetA, G(A), and δ be as in the lemma, and let T be a model of con(A, a) and T .
Moreover, let da be an arbitrary element of con(A, a)I . We show that I can be transformed
into a model J such that J and da are as required.
In the following, we assume that there exists a well-founded linear ordering on the set
∆I × NtF. This can be done w.l.o.g. since it is a byproduct of the proof of Lemma A.1
that, if a concept C is satisfiable w.r.t. a TBox T , then there exist a model of C and T (the
one constructed in the proof) for which such an ordering exists. We construct the model J
from T by modifying the interpretations of temporal features in an appropriate way. To do
this, we successively “mark” pairs in ∆I ×NtF such that a pair (d, g) is marked iff gJ (d)
has already been determined. During the construction of J , the following invariant will
always hold:
if (d1, g1), (d2, g2) ∈∆I ×NtF are marked, then
gI1 (d1)P g
I
2 (d2) with P ∈ {<,=,>} implies gJ1 (d1)P gJ2 (d2).
(∗)
Initially, each pair in ∆I × NtF is unmarked. The construction of J consists of an initial
step and an inductive step.
(1) Initial step. For all 〈a, x〉 : g ∈A, set gJ (da) := δ(x) and mark (da, g).
We need to show that (∗) is satisfied. Hence, fix two marked pairs (da, g1) and
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(da, g2) from ∆I × NtF. Then we have {〈a, x1〉 : g1, 〈a, x2〉 : g2} ⊆ A for some
x1, x2 ∈ Ot. Since neither the Rch nor the Rc1 rule is applicable, we have either
(i) ∃(g1 < g2) ∈ A(a) and x1 < x2 ∈A, (ii) ∃(g1 = g2) ∈A(a) and x1 = x2 ∈ A,
or (iii) ∃(g2 < g1) ∈ A(a) and x2 < x1 ∈ A. We only treat case (i) exemplarily.
By definition of con(A, a) and since da ∈ con(A, a)I , we have da ∈ ∃(g1 < g2)I
and thus gI1 (da) < g
I
2 (da). From x1 < x2 ∈A and the definition of G(A), it follows
that δ(x1) < δ(x2) and hence gJ1 (da) < g
J
2 (da) as required. Cases (ii) and (iii) are
analogous.
(2) Inductive step. Choose the least unmarked pair (d, g) from ∆I × NtF (w.r.t. the
assumed ordering) for which gI(d) is defined. For P ∈ {<,=,>}, let ΨP be the set of
marked pairs (d1, g1) ∈∆I ×NtF for which gI1 (d1)PgI(d). By (∗), we have
• gJ1 (d1)= gJ2 (d2) for all (d1, g1), (d2, g2) ∈Ψ=,
• gJ1 (d1) < gJ2 (d2) for all (d1, g1) ∈Ψ< and (d2, g2) ∈ Ψ= ∪Ψ>, and
• gJ1 (d1) < gJ2 (d2) for all (d1, g1) ∈Ψ= and (d2, g2) ∈ Ψ>.
Hence, due to the density of Q there is a q ∈Q such that
• q > max{gJ1 (d1) | (d1, g1) ∈Ψ<},
• q = gJ1 (d1) for all (d1, g1) ∈ Ψ=, and
• q < min{gJ1 (d1) | (d1, g1) ∈Ψ>}.
Set gJ (d) := q . Obviously, (∗) is satisfied.
It is straightforward to show by structural induction that d ∈CI iff d ∈ CJ for all d ∈∆I
and all T DL-concepts C. Hence, J is a model of con(A, a) and T . By the initial step of
its construction, J is as required. ✷
Lemma 25. LetA be a precompletion of an ABox A′ w.r.t. a TBox T . A is consistent w.r.t.
T iff A is clash-free and con(A, a) is satisfiable w.r.t. T for every a ∈ Oa used in A.
Proof. Since the “only if” direction is straightforward, we concentrate on the “if”
direction. Let U denote the set of object names a ∈ Oa appearing in A. Since A is clash-
free, there exists a solution δ for G(A). For every a ∈ U, fix a model Ia of con(A, a) and
T and a domain element da ∈ ∆Ia such that da ∈ con(A, a)Ia . By Lemma 24, we may
assume w.l.o.g. that, for all a ∈ U,
〈a, x〉 : g ∈A implies gIa (da)= δ(x). (∗)
Moreover, we assume that (i) a = b implies ∆Ia ∩∆Ib = ∅ and (ii) none of the da has
incoming edges, i.e., (d, da) /∈ RIa for all d ∈ ∆Ia and R ∈ NR. It is straightforward to
prove that none of these assumptions restricts generality: for example, take for each a ∈ U
the canonical model constructed from a Hintikka-tree for con(A, a) and T as in the proof
of Lemma A.1. Then apply the modification from the proof of Lemma 24 and finally make
all domains Ia disjoint by renaming. Clearly, (∗), (i), and (ii) are satisfied for the resulting
set of models. In the following, we define an interpretation I by taking the “union” of the
models Ia with a ∈ U and the relational structure defined by the ABox. However, we have
to be careful not to obtain too many abstract feature successors and prefer successors from
the ABox over successors from the models.
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(1) ∆I :=
⋃
a∈U∆Ia ,
(2) AI :=⋃a∈UAIa for all A ∈ NC,
(3) RI := {(da, db) | 〈a, b〉 :R ∈A} ∪⋃a∈URIa for all R ∈ NrR,
(4) f I := {(da, db) | 〈a, b〉 : f ∈A} ∪⋃a∈U{(d, e) ∈ f Ia | d = da or〈a, b〉 : f /∈A for all b ∈ Oa} for all f ∈ NaF,
(5) gI :=⋃a∈U gIa for all g ∈ NtF,
(6) aI := da for all a ∈ U, and
(7) xI := δ(x) for all x ∈ Ot appearing in A.
Note that, for all f ∈ NaF, f I is functional since the Rfe rule is not applicable to A. Since
none of the da has incoming edges, the following claim can be proved straightforwardly
by structural induction:
Claim B.1. For all objects a ∈ A, domain elements d ∈ ∆Ia with d = da , and T DL-
concepts C, we have d ∈CIa iff d ∈ CI .
However, we still need to deal with the elements da themselves.
Claim B.2. For all objects a ∈A, C ∈A(a) implies da ∈CI .
The proof is by induction on the structure of C. The induction start consists of three
cases:
• C ∈ NC. Straightforward by definition of con(A, a), the choice of Ia and da , and the
construction of I .
• C = ∃(u1P u2). By definition of con(A, a) and choice of Ia and da , C ∈A(a) implies
da ∈ CIa . We make a case distinction according to the form of u1 and u2 (recall that
all concepts are assumed to be in path normal form).
(1) u1 = g1 and u2 = g2. Since da ∈ ∃(g1P g2)Ia , there exist q1, q2 ∈ Q such
that gIa1 (da) = q1, gIa2 (da) = q2, and q1P q2. By definition of I , this implies
gI1 (da)= q1, gI2 (da)= q2 and thus da ∈ ∃(g1P g2)I .
(2) u1 = fg1 and u2 = g2. We have to distinguish two subcases. First assume that
〈a, b〉 : f ∈A for some b ∈ Oa. Since the Rc2 rule is not applicable, there exist
x1, x2 ∈ Ot such that {〈a, x1〉 : g1, 〈b, x2〉 : g2, x1P x2} ∈A. Since δ is a solution
for G(A), there are q1, q2 ∈Q such that q1 = δ(x1), q2 = δ(x2), and q1Pq2. Since
Ia and Ib satisfy (∗), we have gIb1 (db) = q1 and gIa2 (da) = q2. By construction
of I , we have f I(da) = db, gI1 (da) = gIa1 (da), and gI2 (db) = gIb2 (db). Hence,
gI1 (da)Pg
I
2 (db) and da ∈ ∃(fg1P g2)I .
Now assume that there is no b ∈ Oa such that 〈a, b〉 : f ∈ A. From da ∈
∃(fg1 P g2)Ia and the construction of I , it follows straightforwardly (similar to
case 1) that da ∈ ∃(fg1 P g2)I .
(3) u1 = g1 and u2 = fg2. Analogous to the previous case using Rc3 instead of Rc2.
• C = g↑. As in the previous case, C ∈ A(a) implies da ∈ CIa . Hence, gIa (da) is
undefined. By definition of I , gI(da) is also undefined and thus da ∈ (g↑)I .
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For the induction step, we make a case distinction according to the topmost constructor
in C:
• C = C1  C2. Since the R rule is not applicable to A and C ∈ A(a), we have
{C1,C2} ⊆ A(a). The induction hypothesis yields da ∈ CI1 and da ∈ CI2 . By the
semantics, we obtain da ∈ CI .
• C = C1 unionsqC2. Similar to the previous case.
• C = ∃R.D with R ∈ NrR. By definition of con(A, a) and choice of Ia and da ,
C ∈ A(a) implies da ∈ CIa . Hence, there exists an e ∈ ∆Ia such that (da, e) ∈ RIa
and e ∈ DIa . Since da has no incoming edges in Ia (see above), we have da = e.
Hence, by Claim B.1, e ∈DIa implies e ∈DI . By construction of I , we additionally
have (da, e) ∈ RI and thus da ∈ (∃R.D)I .
• C = ∃f.D. If there is no b ∈ Oa such that 〈a, b〉 : f ∈A, then we can argue as in the
previous case. Hence assume that such a b exists. Since the R∃f rule is not applicable,
we have b : D ∈A. By induction, we have db ∈DI . Since we have f I(da) = db by
construction of I , we obtain da ∈ (∃f.D)I .
• C = ∀R.D. Fix a pair (da, e) ∈RI . By definition of I , we have either (da, e) ∈ RIa or
e = db and 〈a, b〉 : R ∈A. In the first case, we have e = da since da has no incoming
edges in Ia and e ∈DI by the semantics and Claim B.1. In the second case, we have
D ∈A(b) since the R∀ rule is not applicable to A. Hence, by induction, e ∈DI and
thus da ∈ (∀R.D)I .
This finishes the proof of Claim B.2.
Using the two claims, it is easy to show that T is a model ofA and T . We first show that
T satisfies every assertion in A. For assertions of the form a : C, we have aI = da ∈ CI
by Claim B.2. Assertions 〈a, b〉 : R are obviously satisfied by definition of I . Assertions
〈a, x〉 : g are satisfied by construction of T and since the models Ib (for b ∈ U) satisfy (∗).
Finally, assertions x1P x2 are satisfied since δ is a solution for G(A).
It remains to show that T is a model of T . Fix a concept equation C .= D ∈ T and a
d ∈∆I . First assume that d = da for all a ∈ U. Let d ∈∆Ia . Then d ∈ CI iff d ∈DI by
Claim B.1 and since Ia is a model of T . Now assume d = da . Since the R .= rule is not
applicable to A, we have a :CT ∈A. Hence, by Claim B.2, da ∈CIT . By definition of CT ,
this clearly implies da ∈CI iff da ∈DI . ✷
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